Many Muslims Turn to Home Schooling - USA
The New York Times
March 26, 2008
Many Muslims Turn to Home Schooling
By NEIL MacFARQUHAR
David Kadlubowski for The New York Times
Karima Tung, 12, one of three girls home-schooled by their mother, Fawzia Mai Tung. An important part of the school day: reading the Koran.
David Kadlubowski for The New York Times
Karima, right, with her sisters, Kiram, 8, and Kadhima, 14, playing with yo-yos in a study break at their Phoenix home.
LODI, Calif. — Like dozens of other Pakistani-American girls here, Hajra Bibi stopped attending the local public school when she reached puberty, and began studying at home.
Her family wanted her to clean and cook for her male relatives, and had also worried that other American children would mock both her Muslim religion and her traditional clothes.
“Some men don’t like it when you wear American clothes — they don’t think it is a good thing for girls,” said Miss Bibi, 17, now studying at the 12th-grade level in this agricultural center some 70 miles east of San Francisco. “You have to be respectable.”
Across the United States, Muslims who find that a public school education clashes with their religious or cultural traditions have turned to home schooling. That choice is intended partly as a way to build a solid Muslim identity away from the prejudices that their children, boys and girls alike, can face in schoolyards. But in some cases, as in Ms. Bibi’s, the intent is also to isolate their adolescent and teenage daughters from the corrupting influences that they see in much of American life.
About 40 percent of the Pakistani and other Southeast Asian girls of high school age who are enrolled in the district here are home-schooled, though broader statistics on the number of Muslim children being home-schooled, and how well they do academically, are elusive. Even estimates on the number of all American children being taught at home swing broadly, from one million to two million.
No matter what the faith, parents who make the choice are often inspired by a belief that public schools are havens for social ills like drugs and that they can do better with their children at home.
“I don’t want the behavior,” said Aya Ismael, a Muslim mother home-schooling four children near San Jose. “Little girls are walking around dressing like hoochies, cursing and swearing and showing disrespect toward their elders. In Islam we believe in respect and dignity and honor.”
Still, the subject of home schooling is a contentious one in various Muslim communities, with opponents arguing that Muslim children are better off staying in the system and, if need be, fighting for their rights.
Robina Asghar, a Muslim who does social work in Stockton, Calif., says the fact that her son was repeatedly branded a “terrorist” in school hallways sharpened his interest in civil rights and inspired a dream to become a lawyer. He now attends a Catholic high school.
“My son had a hard time in school, but every time something happened it was a learning moment for him,” Mrs. Asghar said. “He learned how to cope. A lot of people were discriminated against in this country, but the only thing that brings change is education.”
Many parents, however, would rather their children learn in a less difficult environment, and opt to keep them home.
Hina Khan-Mukhtar decided to tutor her three sons at home and to send them to a small Muslim school cooperative established by some 15 Bay Area families for subjects like Arabic, science and carpentry. She made up her mind after visiting her oldest son’s prospective public school kindergarten, where each pupil had assembled a scrapbook titled “Why I Like Pigs.” Mrs. Khan-Mukhtar read with dismay what the children had written about the delicious taste of pork, barred by Islam. “I remembered at that age how important it was to fit in,” she said.
Many Muslim parents contacted for this article were reluctant to talk, saying Muslim home-schoolers were often portrayed as religious extremists. That view is partly fueled by the fact that Adam Gadahn, an American-born spokesman for Al Qaeda, was home-schooled in rural California.
“There is a tendency to make home-schoolers look like antisocial fanatics who don’t want their kids in the system,” said Nabila Hanson, who argues that most home-schoolers, like herself, make an extra effort to find their children opportunities for sports, music or field trips with other people.
Lodi’s Muslims also attracted unwanted national attention when one local man, Hamid Hayat, was sentenced last year to 24 years in prison on a terrorism conviction that his relatives say was largely due to a fabricated confession. (Had he been more Americanized, they say, he would have known to ask for a lawyer as soon as the F.B.I. appeared.)
Parents who home-school tend to be converts, Mrs. Khan-Mukhtar said. Immigrant parents she has encountered generally oppose the idea, seeing educational opportunities in America as a main reason for coming.
If so, then Fawzia Mai Tung is an exception, a Chinese Muslim immigrant who home-schools three daughters in Phoenix. She spent many sleepless nights worried that her children would not excel on standardized tests, until she discovered how low the scores at the local schools were. Her oldest son, also home-schooled, is now applying to medical school.
In some cases, home-schooling is used primarily as a way to isolate girls like Miss Bibi, the Pakistani-American here in Lodi.
Some 80 percent of the city’s 2,500 Muslims are Pakistani, and many are interrelated villagers who try to recreate the conservative social atmosphere back home. A decade ago many girls were simply shipped back to their villages once they reached adolescence.
“Their families want them to retain their culture and not become Americanized,” said Roberta Wall, the principal of the district-run Independent School, which supervises home schooling in Lodi and where home-schooled students attend weekly hourlong tutorials.
Of more than 90 Pakistani or other Southeast Asian girls of high school age who are enrolled in the Lodi district, 38 are being home-schooled. By contrast, just 7 of the 107 boys are being home-schooled, and usually the reason is that they were falling behind academically.
As soon as they finish their schooling, the girls are married off, often to cousins brought in from their families’ old villages.
The parents “want their girls safe at home and away from evil things like boys, drinking and drugs,” said Kristine Leach, a veteran teacher with the Independent School.
The girls follow the regular high school curriculum, squeezing in study time among housework, cooking, praying and reading the Koran. The teachers at the weekly tutorials occasionally crack jokes of the “what, are your brothers’ arms broken?” variety, but in general they tread lightly, sensing that their students obey family and tradition because they have no alternative.
“I do miss my friends,” Miss Bibi said of fellow students with whom she once attended public school. “We would hang out and do fun things, help each other with our homework.”
But being schooled apart does have its benefit, she added. “We don’t want anyone to point a finger at us,” she said, “to say that we are bad.”
Mrs. Asghar, the Stockton woman who argues against home schooling, takes exception to the idea of removing girls from school to preserve family honor, calling it a barrier to assimilation.
“People who think like this are stuck in a time capsule,” she said. “When kids know more than their parents, the parents lose control. I think that is a fear in all of us.”
Aishah Bashir, now an 18-year-old Independent School student, was sent back to Pakistan when she was 12 and stayed till she was 16. She had no education there.
Asked about home schooling, she said it was the best choice. But she admitted that the choice was not hers and, asked if she would home-school her own daughter, stared mutely at the floor. Finally she said quietly: “When I have a daughter, I want her to learn more than me. I want her to be more educated.”
Copyright 2008 The New York Times Company
Wednesday, March 26, 2008
STRATFOR - A New French Strategy - by George Friedman
STRATFOR - A New French Strategy - by George Friedman
Strategic Forecasting logo
A New French Strategy
March 25, 2008
Graphic for Geopolitical Intelligence Report
Related Special Topic Page
· Europe’s Return to Power Politics
By George Friedman
French President Nicolas Sarkozy announced the week of March 16 that France is cutting its nuclear arsenal to less than 300 warheads, which he said was less than half the number France had during the Cold War. Meanwhile, plans are under way in Paris to return to full membership in NATO; Sarkozy will travel to London the week of March 23 to discuss reintegration.
Sarkozy spoke while attending the launch of France’s newest nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine in Cherbourg. During his speech, he added that, at present, none of France’s nuclear weapons is aimed at anyone. During the same appearance he said, “All those who threaten to attack our vital interests expose themselves to a severe riposte by France.” This was said in the context of discussions of Iran, which he said was among those countries in the process of developing nuclear weapons. France is simultaneously calling attention to its nuclear capability and adopting an increasingly hostile posture toward Iran. While the media focus is on Sarkozy, it seems to us that this issue goes deeper than personalities. Processes are under way that are shifting French foreign policy.
The shift is not a dramatic one yet; there is more continuity than discontinuity in French foreign policy. Like all French leaders for the last half-century, Sarkozy is focusing on his country’s strategic independence, particularly on its nuclear capability. At the same time, France is aligning itself more closely with the U.S. view of Iran, and, to some extent, with the U.S. view of the Middle East. In doing so, France is creating stresses within the European Union and reshaping its relationship with Germany. These small changes have broad implications that need to be understood.
Foreign Policy Since 1871
Since 1871, France has had two foreign policies. The year 1871 saw German unification. Prior to 1871, the fragmentation of Germany into numerous ministates secured France’s eastern frontier; France concerned itself with the rest of Atlantic Europe, particularly Spain and England. German unification redefined French geopolitics by creating a major power to its east. This major power was insecure because it was caught between France, Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. German insecurity made it a threat to France. A united Germany had to deal with the causes of that insecurity, and France was one of those causes. German unification effectively coincided with the defeat of France by Prussia, and drove home the significance of a unified Germany.
From German unification and the Franco-Prussian war until 1945, the essence of French foreign policy consisted of managing Germany. That meant France had to change its relationship with its historic rival, the United Kingdom, and keep Russia aligned with the Anglo-French alliance. For more than 80 years, French foreign policy could be boiled down to containing Germany. The strategy proved successful, assuming one accepts the losses incurred in World War I and five years of occupation during World War II. In the end, France survived.
This set in place France’s second post-1871 strategy, which evolved over the 1950s until its institutionalization by Charles de Gaulle. This postwar strategy consisted of two parts. The first part involved embedding France into multinational institutions, particularly the European Economic Community (EEC) — which evolved into the European Union — and NATO. The second part involved using these institutions to preserve French sovereignty and independence. Put differently, France’s strategy was to participate in multinational structures while using them for its own ends, or at least defining a limited relationship with the structures.
France’s overriding concern was to avoid getting caught in a third world war after having been devastated by the first two world wars. Preventing this outcome meant exploiting German disunification, effectively ending France’s primordial fear of Germany. It did this in two ways. The first involved drawing close to West Germany economically, creating a system of relationships that would make Franco-German conflict impossible. The second involved blocking the Soviet threat by participating in NATO.
France’s problem was that the deeper that it went into European institutions and NATO, the more tenuous its sovereignty became. It needed the economic and military relationship with Germany, but it had to retain its room for maneuver. More precisely, it wanted to draw closer to Germany and take advantage of a collective security scheme, but not become a client state of the United States. It therefore belonged to NATO, but pulled out of the alliance’s integrated military command structure in 1966. NATO’s military structure made certain responses to a Soviet invasion automatic. France refused to allow its response to be automatic, but remained committed to collective defense.
France was concerned with maximizing its autonomy, but it had a deeper fear as well. The defense of Western Europe was predicated on U.S. intervention. The doctrine of massive response held that, in the event of a Soviet invasion that could not be contained conventionally, the United States would use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. The U.S. position was thus to initiate a nuclear war that would potentially see America’s cities decimated, all in order to protect Europe.
The French problem, however, was that Paris would not know whether Washington would honor this commitment until after the initiation of hostilities. From the French point of view, it would be irrational for the United States to invite its own devastation to protect Europe. Therefore, the American commitment was at best untestable. At worst, it was an implausible and transparent attempt to jeopardize Europe so as to deter a Soviet attack without the United States risking anything fundamental.
An Independent Deterrent
The need to protect French sovereignty intersected with what Paris saw as a genuine requirement to maintain a military capability outside the framework of NATO, all the while remaining part of NATO and the EEC. France wanted NATO to function. It wanted to be close to Germany. And it wanted a set of options outside the context of NATO that would guarantee that France would not be reoccupied, this time by the Soviets.
The decision to construct an independent French nuclear deterrent was based on this reasoning. As de Gaulle put it, France wanted to retain the ability to tear off an arm if the Soviets attacked France through Germany. It was unsure whether the United States would act to deter the Soviet Union, but even a small nuclear force in the hands of a power likely to suffer occupation — and thus a force very likely to be used — would deter the Soviets. Therefore, the French developed (and retain) the nuclear force that Sarkozy decided to cut but not eliminate.
This issue remained at the heart of U.S.-French tensions both during and after the Cold War. The American view was that the United States and all of Western Europe (plus some Mediterranean countries) had a vested interest in resisting the Soviets, and they could do so most effectively by joining in multilateral economic and military organizations allowing them to operate in concert. The Americans viewed the French reluctance to follow suit as France seeking a free ride. From the American point of view, the U.S. bore the brunt of the cost of defending Europe, as well as underwriting Europe’s economic recovery in the early years. France benefited from both, and would benefit as long as the United States defended Germany. Paris wanted the benefits of the American presence without committing itself to burden-sharing. Put another way, how could the Americans be certain that, in the event of war, France would protect Germany, Italy or Turkey? Perhaps Paris would remain alo of unless France were attacked.
The French mistrust of the credibility of U.S. commitment to Europe collided with American mistrust of French reasons for being part of NATO without committing itself to collaborate automatically in NATO’s response to the Soviets. France was comfortable with this ambiguity. It needed it. It needed to integrate economically with the Germans, to be part of NATO, but to retain its own options for national defense. If this meant increasing American distrust, and even a sense of betrayal, this was something France must tolerate to achieve its strategic goals.
With the fall of the Soviet Union, France entered a new strategic phase. The French responded to the Soviet collapse and to German reunification by maintaining and extending its core policy. It remained ambiguously part of NATO, participating as it saw fit. It really concentrated on transforming the European Union into a multinational federation, with its own integrated foreign policy and defense policy.
This position appears paradoxical. On the one hand, France wanted to maintain its national sovereignty and freedom of action. On the other, it wanted to be a counterbalance to the United States and to draw ever closer to Germany — permanently eliminating the historic danger from its eastern neighbor, however distant the German threat might appear under current circumstances. France could not resist the United States alone. It could do so only in the context of a European federation, which would of course include the critical French relationship with Germany.
Independence vs. Europe
France therefore had to choose between a wholly independent foreign policy and federation with Europe. It tried to have its cake and eat it too. It supported the principle of federation, and within this federation it sought a particularly close relationship with Germany. But its view of this new federation was that while, in a formal sense, France would abandon a degree of sovereignty, in practical terms — so long as France could be the senior partner to Germany — the French would dominate a European federation. In effect, federation would open the door to a Europe directed, if not dominated, by Paris.
This is why Central Europe revolted against French President Jacques Chirac on the eve of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The Central Europeans were not particularly enthusiastic about the war, but they were far less enthusiastic about Chirac’s actions. From their point of view, he was using the Iraq issue to create a European bloc, led by France in opposition to the United States. For a country such as Poland that had relied on French (and British) guarantees prior to World War II, the idea that France should lead a Europe in opposition to the United States was unacceptable. Chirac gave a famous press conference in which he condemned the Central European rejection of French opposition to the invasion as representing nations that were “not well brought up.” This was the moment in which French frustration welled over.
France was not going to get the federation it hoped for. Too many countries of Europe wanted to retain their freedom of action, this time from France. They were not opposed to economic union, but the creation of a federation with a joint foreign and defense policy was not enthusiastically greeted by smaller European countries (and some not-so-small countries such as Britain, Spain and Italy). As anti-federationism grew, it swept forward to include France as well, which rejected the European constitution in a plebiscite.
This moment was the existential crisis that created the Sarkozy presidency. Sarkozy has raised two questions that have been fundamental to France. The first is France’s relationship to Germany. France has been obsessed with Germany since 1871, at first hostile, later nearly married, but always obsessed. The second question relates to France’s relationship to the United States. Chirac represented postwar Gaullism’s view in its most extreme form: Convert European institutions into a French-dominated multinational force to balance U.S. power. This attempt collapsed, so Sarkozy had to define the relationship France might have with the United States if France could not counterbalance the United States.
The Mediterranean Union
The questions of Germany and of the United States were addressed in the French idea of a Mediterranean Union. Since German unification in 1871, France has obsessed about the north German plain. But France is also a Mediterranean power, with long-term interests in North Africa and the Middle East in such countries as Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon and Syria. Where Germany is entirely a northern European power, France is not. Therefore, Chirac proposed that, in addition to being a member of the European Union, France should create a separate and distinct Mediterranean Europe. The latter grouping would include the rest of th e Mediterranean basin, extending as far as Turkey and Israel. It would exclude non-Mediterranean powers such as Germany and Britain, however.
France had no intention of withdrawing from the European Union, but saw the Mediterranean Union as a supplemental relationship, and argued that it would allow EU expansion without actually admitting new EU members. The Germans saw this as a French attempt to become Europe’s strategic pivot, leading both unions and serving as the only member that was both a northern European and a Mediterranean power. The Germans did not like this scenario one bit. The French then backed off, but did not abandon the idea.
If the French are going to be a Mediterranean power, they must also be a Middle Eastern power. If they are playing in the Middle East, they must redefine their relationship with the United States. Sarkozy has done that by drawing systematically closer to American views on Iran, Syria and Lebanon. In other words, to pursue this new course, the French have drawn away from the Germans and closer to the Americans.
This is all very early in the game, and the moves so far are very small. But the French have slightly backed off from their German obsession and their fear of the United States. The collapse of European federationism has set off a reconsideration of France’s global role, a reconsideration that will — if continued — radically redefine France’s core relationships. What the French are doing is what they have done for years: They are looking for maximum freedom of action for France without undue risk. Though France has long pursued its interests with consistency, its current moves are different. It appears to be pulling away from Germany and seeking power in the Mediterranean. And that means working with the Americans.
Tell George what you think
Strategic Forecasting logo
A New French Strategy
March 25, 2008
Graphic for Geopolitical Intelligence Report
Related Special Topic Page
· Europe’s Return to Power Politics
By George Friedman
French President Nicolas Sarkozy announced the week of March 16 that France is cutting its nuclear arsenal to less than 300 warheads, which he said was less than half the number France had during the Cold War. Meanwhile, plans are under way in Paris to return to full membership in NATO; Sarkozy will travel to London the week of March 23 to discuss reintegration.
Sarkozy spoke while attending the launch of France’s newest nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine in Cherbourg. During his speech, he added that, at present, none of France’s nuclear weapons is aimed at anyone. During the same appearance he said, “All those who threaten to attack our vital interests expose themselves to a severe riposte by France.” This was said in the context of discussions of Iran, which he said was among those countries in the process of developing nuclear weapons. France is simultaneously calling attention to its nuclear capability and adopting an increasingly hostile posture toward Iran. While the media focus is on Sarkozy, it seems to us that this issue goes deeper than personalities. Processes are under way that are shifting French foreign policy.
The shift is not a dramatic one yet; there is more continuity than discontinuity in French foreign policy. Like all French leaders for the last half-century, Sarkozy is focusing on his country’s strategic independence, particularly on its nuclear capability. At the same time, France is aligning itself more closely with the U.S. view of Iran, and, to some extent, with the U.S. view of the Middle East. In doing so, France is creating stresses within the European Union and reshaping its relationship with Germany. These small changes have broad implications that need to be understood.
Foreign Policy Since 1871
Since 1871, France has had two foreign policies. The year 1871 saw German unification. Prior to 1871, the fragmentation of Germany into numerous ministates secured France’s eastern frontier; France concerned itself with the rest of Atlantic Europe, particularly Spain and England. German unification redefined French geopolitics by creating a major power to its east. This major power was insecure because it was caught between France, Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. German insecurity made it a threat to France. A united Germany had to deal with the causes of that insecurity, and France was one of those causes. German unification effectively coincided with the defeat of France by Prussia, and drove home the significance of a unified Germany.
From German unification and the Franco-Prussian war until 1945, the essence of French foreign policy consisted of managing Germany. That meant France had to change its relationship with its historic rival, the United Kingdom, and keep Russia aligned with the Anglo-French alliance. For more than 80 years, French foreign policy could be boiled down to containing Germany. The strategy proved successful, assuming one accepts the losses incurred in World War I and five years of occupation during World War II. In the end, France survived.
This set in place France’s second post-1871 strategy, which evolved over the 1950s until its institutionalization by Charles de Gaulle. This postwar strategy consisted of two parts. The first part involved embedding France into multinational institutions, particularly the European Economic Community (EEC) — which evolved into the European Union — and NATO. The second part involved using these institutions to preserve French sovereignty and independence. Put differently, France’s strategy was to participate in multinational structures while using them for its own ends, or at least defining a limited relationship with the structures.
France’s overriding concern was to avoid getting caught in a third world war after having been devastated by the first two world wars. Preventing this outcome meant exploiting German disunification, effectively ending France’s primordial fear of Germany. It did this in two ways. The first involved drawing close to West Germany economically, creating a system of relationships that would make Franco-German conflict impossible. The second involved blocking the Soviet threat by participating in NATO.
France’s problem was that the deeper that it went into European institutions and NATO, the more tenuous its sovereignty became. It needed the economic and military relationship with Germany, but it had to retain its room for maneuver. More precisely, it wanted to draw closer to Germany and take advantage of a collective security scheme, but not become a client state of the United States. It therefore belonged to NATO, but pulled out of the alliance’s integrated military command structure in 1966. NATO’s military structure made certain responses to a Soviet invasion automatic. France refused to allow its response to be automatic, but remained committed to collective defense.
France was concerned with maximizing its autonomy, but it had a deeper fear as well. The defense of Western Europe was predicated on U.S. intervention. The doctrine of massive response held that, in the event of a Soviet invasion that could not be contained conventionally, the United States would use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. The U.S. position was thus to initiate a nuclear war that would potentially see America’s cities decimated, all in order to protect Europe.
The French problem, however, was that Paris would not know whether Washington would honor this commitment until after the initiation of hostilities. From the French point of view, it would be irrational for the United States to invite its own devastation to protect Europe. Therefore, the American commitment was at best untestable. At worst, it was an implausible and transparent attempt to jeopardize Europe so as to deter a Soviet attack without the United States risking anything fundamental.
An Independent Deterrent
The need to protect French sovereignty intersected with what Paris saw as a genuine requirement to maintain a military capability outside the framework of NATO, all the while remaining part of NATO and the EEC. France wanted NATO to function. It wanted to be close to Germany. And it wanted a set of options outside the context of NATO that would guarantee that France would not be reoccupied, this time by the Soviets.
The decision to construct an independent French nuclear deterrent was based on this reasoning. As de Gaulle put it, France wanted to retain the ability to tear off an arm if the Soviets attacked France through Germany. It was unsure whether the United States would act to deter the Soviet Union, but even a small nuclear force in the hands of a power likely to suffer occupation — and thus a force very likely to be used — would deter the Soviets. Therefore, the French developed (and retain) the nuclear force that Sarkozy decided to cut but not eliminate.
This issue remained at the heart of U.S.-French tensions both during and after the Cold War. The American view was that the United States and all of Western Europe (plus some Mediterranean countries) had a vested interest in resisting the Soviets, and they could do so most effectively by joining in multilateral economic and military organizations allowing them to operate in concert. The Americans viewed the French reluctance to follow suit as France seeking a free ride. From the American point of view, the U.S. bore the brunt of the cost of defending Europe, as well as underwriting Europe’s economic recovery in the early years. France benefited from both, and would benefit as long as the United States defended Germany. Paris wanted the benefits of the American presence without committing itself to burden-sharing. Put another way, how could the Americans be certain that, in the event of war, France would protect Germany, Italy or Turkey? Perhaps Paris would remain alo of unless France were attacked.
The French mistrust of the credibility of U.S. commitment to Europe collided with American mistrust of French reasons for being part of NATO without committing itself to collaborate automatically in NATO’s response to the Soviets. France was comfortable with this ambiguity. It needed it. It needed to integrate economically with the Germans, to be part of NATO, but to retain its own options for national defense. If this meant increasing American distrust, and even a sense of betrayal, this was something France must tolerate to achieve its strategic goals.
With the fall of the Soviet Union, France entered a new strategic phase. The French responded to the Soviet collapse and to German reunification by maintaining and extending its core policy. It remained ambiguously part of NATO, participating as it saw fit. It really concentrated on transforming the European Union into a multinational federation, with its own integrated foreign policy and defense policy.
This position appears paradoxical. On the one hand, France wanted to maintain its national sovereignty and freedom of action. On the other, it wanted to be a counterbalance to the United States and to draw ever closer to Germany — permanently eliminating the historic danger from its eastern neighbor, however distant the German threat might appear under current circumstances. France could not resist the United States alone. It could do so only in the context of a European federation, which would of course include the critical French relationship with Germany.
Independence vs. Europe
France therefore had to choose between a wholly independent foreign policy and federation with Europe. It tried to have its cake and eat it too. It supported the principle of federation, and within this federation it sought a particularly close relationship with Germany. But its view of this new federation was that while, in a formal sense, France would abandon a degree of sovereignty, in practical terms — so long as France could be the senior partner to Germany — the French would dominate a European federation. In effect, federation would open the door to a Europe directed, if not dominated, by Paris.
This is why Central Europe revolted against French President Jacques Chirac on the eve of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The Central Europeans were not particularly enthusiastic about the war, but they were far less enthusiastic about Chirac’s actions. From their point of view, he was using the Iraq issue to create a European bloc, led by France in opposition to the United States. For a country such as Poland that had relied on French (and British) guarantees prior to World War II, the idea that France should lead a Europe in opposition to the United States was unacceptable. Chirac gave a famous press conference in which he condemned the Central European rejection of French opposition to the invasion as representing nations that were “not well brought up.” This was the moment in which French frustration welled over.
France was not going to get the federation it hoped for. Too many countries of Europe wanted to retain their freedom of action, this time from France. They were not opposed to economic union, but the creation of a federation with a joint foreign and defense policy was not enthusiastically greeted by smaller European countries (and some not-so-small countries such as Britain, Spain and Italy). As anti-federationism grew, it swept forward to include France as well, which rejected the European constitution in a plebiscite.
This moment was the existential crisis that created the Sarkozy presidency. Sarkozy has raised two questions that have been fundamental to France. The first is France’s relationship to Germany. France has been obsessed with Germany since 1871, at first hostile, later nearly married, but always obsessed. The second question relates to France’s relationship to the United States. Chirac represented postwar Gaullism’s view in its most extreme form: Convert European institutions into a French-dominated multinational force to balance U.S. power. This attempt collapsed, so Sarkozy had to define the relationship France might have with the United States if France could not counterbalance the United States.
The Mediterranean Union
The questions of Germany and of the United States were addressed in the French idea of a Mediterranean Union. Since German unification in 1871, France has obsessed about the north German plain. But France is also a Mediterranean power, with long-term interests in North Africa and the Middle East in such countries as Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon and Syria. Where Germany is entirely a northern European power, France is not. Therefore, Chirac proposed that, in addition to being a member of the European Union, France should create a separate and distinct Mediterranean Europe. The latter grouping would include the rest of th e Mediterranean basin, extending as far as Turkey and Israel. It would exclude non-Mediterranean powers such as Germany and Britain, however.
France had no intention of withdrawing from the European Union, but saw the Mediterranean Union as a supplemental relationship, and argued that it would allow EU expansion without actually admitting new EU members. The Germans saw this as a French attempt to become Europe’s strategic pivot, leading both unions and serving as the only member that was both a northern European and a Mediterranean power. The Germans did not like this scenario one bit. The French then backed off, but did not abandon the idea.
If the French are going to be a Mediterranean power, they must also be a Middle Eastern power. If they are playing in the Middle East, they must redefine their relationship with the United States. Sarkozy has done that by drawing systematically closer to American views on Iran, Syria and Lebanon. In other words, to pursue this new course, the French have drawn away from the Germans and closer to the Americans.
This is all very early in the game, and the moves so far are very small. But the French have slightly backed off from their German obsession and their fear of the United States. The collapse of European federationism has set off a reconsideration of France’s global role, a reconsideration that will — if continued — radically redefine France’s core relationships. What the French are doing is what they have done for years: They are looking for maximum freedom of action for France without undue risk. Though France has long pursued its interests with consistency, its current moves are different. It appears to be pulling away from Germany and seeking power in the Mediterranean. And that means working with the Americans.
Tell George what you think
Many Iraqi women say life was better under Saddam Hussein – AND OTHER ASSOCIATED ARTICLES
Many Iraqi women say life was better under Saddam Hussein – AND OTHER ASSOCIATED ARTICLES
The Manila Times
Opinion
Wednesday, March 26, 2008
Many Iraqi women say life
was better under Saddam
By Nafia Abdul Jabbar and Marwa Sabah, Agence France-Presse
BAGHDAD: Iraqi women say they are now worse off than they were during the rule of dictator Saddam Hussein and that their plight has deteriorated year by year since the US-led invasion in March 2003.
Now they are demanding not just equal rights but the very “right to live,” says Shameran Marugi, head of the non-governmental organisation Iraqi Women’s Committee.
“The ‘right to live’ is a slogan that we have begun using because a women’s life in Iraq is being threatened on all sides. Laws are not being implemented equally and society is ignoring women,” Maguri told AFP.
“Before the 2003 invasion it was possible for a woman to lead a normal life as long as she followed state policy,” she said.
“It was even possible for a woman to engage in political and economic activities through the official Union of Iraqi Women.
“When the regime change occurred in 2003, women, men, and children went out on to the streets to celebrate. We were very happy,” she said.
“Unfortunately there was no qualified leadership to handle the situation and society was not equipped to deal with the changes.”
The Union of Iraqi Women was dismantled after the invasion as it was affiliated to the former Baath Party of Saddam.
In the past few years, Marugi said, violence against women has increased significantly.
“At home a woman faces violence from her father, husband, brother and even from her son. It has become a kind of a new culture in the society,” said the women’s rights campaigner.
Out in society, women are subjected to verbal abuse on the streets if they are not wearing a hijab and in extreme cases face being abducted by unknown gunmen, who sexually abuse and then kill them.
“It has also become normal for women to receive death threats for working for example as a hairdresser or a tailor, for not wearing a hijab or not dressing ‘decently’,” said Marugi, adding: “In addition to equal rights we are now demanding the ‘right to live’.”
Although there are no official nationwide figures available, rights activists report numerous cases of so-called “honour killings” in the southern city of Basra, in the northern Kurdish area and in the capital Baghdad.
A United Nations report said police in Basra registered 44 cases in 2007 where women were killed with multiple gunshot wounds after being accused of committing “honour crimes”.
In Baghdad, the report said, several women teachers have been shot dead by armed men, some of them in front of their students.
A report by the US-based Women For Women International released earlier this month said the state of Iraqi women has become a “national crisis” since the March 2003 US-led invasion.
“Present-day Iraq is plagued by insecurity, a lack of infrastructure and controversial leadership, transforming the situation for women from one of relative autonomy and security before the war into a national crisis,” said the report.
It said 64 percent of the women surveyed complained that violence against them had increased.
“When asked why, respondents most commonly said that there is less respect for women’s rights than before, that women are thought of as possessions, and that the economy has gotten worse,” it said.
The report also found that 76 percent of the women interviewed said that girls in their families were forbidden from attending school.
Selma Jabu, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani’s consultant for women’s affairs, said apart from being sidelined politically Iraqi women are subjected to abuse and intimidation on the streets and face violent sexual abuse.
“There is terrorist violence, including bombs, against the Iraqi people in general on the streets. But there is specific violence against women who are being abducted for sex and subjected to many other crimes,” Jabu said.
“The Iraqi constitution protects and supports women on some issues, but there are other issues we have not agreed upon and we are doing our best to get them in to the constitution,” she said.
Iqbal Ali, in her forties, said death threats had forced her to close her hairdressing salon in Baghdad’s central Karada neighbourhood.
“In the beginning everything was going all right but afterwards the situation in the country deteriorated, women hairdressers started getting threats. My work was affected and I closed my salon down.”
She has now opened a cosmetics and perfume shop which she has named Alwarda Albaidaa (white rose).
“I was in a difficult situation financially with no access to rations, no assistance from the government. I was without a job. So I decided to borrow money and open this shop,” she added.
Suad Mohammed, an employee in Adhamiyah municipality in northwestern Baghdad, carries a pistol in her handbag.
“As an Iraqi woman I don’t think it is safe for me to step out of my house freely. So whenever I go out I carry a weapon with me to defend myself,” said Mohammed.
She said that last year she had gone to a bank to pick up the salary of an old woman who was unable to get there herself, and on the way back the taxi driver turned off and began driving towards the sprawling Shiite neighbourhood of Sadr City.
“He refused to stop and I started screaming. And then I remembered I was carrying a weapon, so I decided to defend myself. The only thing I was thinking about was the woman’s salary.
“I pulled my weapon from my purse and hit him on his neck and hands. He started bleeding but still did not stop. Finally, the taxi was stopped by a passing military convoy and the driver was taken away.”
Since then, said Mohammed, “every time I leave my neighbourhood I make sure I carry my weapon”.
Editor and Publisher
5 Years Later: Pundits Who Were Wrong on Iraq Are Silent
To choose just one example: David Brooks. Exactly five years ago, on the verge of war, he even attacked his current employer, The New York Times, for calling for "still more discussion" before attacking Iraq.
(March 25, 2008) -- Given the current tragedy in Iraq--hell, given the past five years--you would think the many pundits who agitated for an attack on that country, largely on false pretenses, would have take the opportunity of the arrival of the fifth anniversary of the war (or the 4000 dead milestone) to drop to their knees, at least in print, and beg the American public for forgiveness.
With more than 60 percent of their fellow Americans now calling the war a "mistake" and agitating for troop withdrawals--and the president's approval rating still heading south, thanks to their war--it would seem to be the right thing to do. We won't even mention the maiming of more than 20,000 young Americans and tens of thousands of Iraqis.
You can probably name your favorite candidate. Let's take David Brooks of The New York Times, for example, and what he wrote exactly five years ago. He hasn't bothered to revisit his errors in judgement lately. At least Richard Cohen, another favorite whipping boy of antiwar critics, has accepted responsibility for some of his lapses.
Brooks is among those who have long argued that they actually got the war right, but Donald Rumsfeld made it wrong. In other words, war good, Rummy bad. He has emphasized that he and many of his fellow pundits had it right at the time in urging more boots on the ground. They were "prescient," he relates. But Rumsfeld and his crowd "got things wrong, and the pundits often got things right."
He never cites any of his own views at the time, obviously hoping that readers will place him among those pundits that "got things right." And also: please forget that he was a strong supporter of the invasion to start with.
In fact, he bears special blame -- or shame, if you will -- not only for his writing, but for serving as senior editor of the most influential (inside the White House) pro-war publication, The Weekly Standard, headed by Bill Kristol, who has been even more consistently wrong on the war, yet rewarded with a prestigious New York Times slot.
Come to think of it, Brooks got the same reward -- two for the price of two!
Brooks may want you to forget what he wrote five years ago, but here's a trip down memory lane with Our Mr. Brooks.
From his column in The Weekly Standard, March 10, 2003:
"The American commentariat is gravely concerned. Over the past week, George W. Bush has shown a disturbing tendency not to waffle when it comes to Iraq. There has been an appalling clarity and coherence to his position. There has been a reckless tendency not to be murky, hesitant, or evasive. Naturally, questions are being raised about President Bush's leadership skills.
"Meanwhile, among the smart set, Hamlet-like indecision has become the intellectual fashion. The liberal columnist E. J. Dionne wrote in The Washington Post that he is uncomfortable with the pro- and anti-war camps. He praised the doubters and raised his colors on behalf of 'heroic ambivalence.' The New York Times, venturing deep into the territory of self-parody, ran a full-page editorial calling for 'still more discussion' on whether or not to go to war.
"In certain circles, it is not only important what opinion you hold, but how you hold it. It is important to be seen dancing with complexity, sliding among shades of gray. Any poor rube can come to a simple conclusion--that President Saddam Hussein is a menace who must be disarmed--but the refined ratiocinators want to be seen luxuriating amid the difficulties, donning the jewels of nuance, even to the point of self-paralysis.
"But those who actually have to lead and protect, and actually have to build one step on another, have to bring some questions to a close. Bush gave Saddam time to disarm. Saddam did not. Hence, the issue of whether to disarm him forcibly is settled. The French and the Germans and the domestic critics may keep debating, which is their luxury, but the people who actually make the decisions have moved on to more practical concerns. . . ."
From his Weekly Standard column two weeks later:
"The president has remained resolute. Momentum to liberate Iraq continues to build. The situation has clarified, and history will allow clear judgments about which leaders and which institutions were up to the challenge posed by Saddam and which were not.
"Over the past 12 years the United States has sought to disarm or depose Saddam--more forcefully since September 11 than before. Throughout that time, France and Russia have sought to undermine sanctions and fend off the ousting of Saddam. They opposed Clinton's efforts to bomb Saddam, just as they oppose Bush's push for regime change. Through the fog and verbiage, that is the essential confrontation. Events will show who was right, George W. Bush or Jacques Chirac.
"What matters, and what ultimately sprang the U.N. trap, is American resolve. The administration simply wouldn't let up. It didn't matter how Hans Blix muddied the waters with his reports on this or that weapons system. Under the U.N. resolutions, it was up to Saddam to disarm, administration officials repeated ad nauseam, and he wasn't doing it. It was and is sheer relentlessness that has driven us to where we are today.
"Which is ironic. We are in this situation because the first Bush administration was not relentless in its pursuit of Saddam Hussein. That is a mistake this Bush administration will not repeat."
*
Greg Mitchell's new book is "So Wrong for So Long: How the Press, the Pundits -- and the President -- Failed on Iraq." It features a foreword by Joe Galloway and preface by Bruce Springteen.
Editor and Publisher
5 Years Ago: Why Was Public So Misinformed on Facts Leading to War?
By E&P Staff
Published: March 23, 2008 11:10 AM ET
NEW YORK Five years ago today, as the U.S invasion of Iraq continued in its early stages, E&P published an article by Ari Berman, then an intern here, that examined the public attitudes on the eve of the war. He probed polls that found, on the most basic point, that roughly 2 out of 3 Americans backed an assault on Iraq.
But the attitudes driving those numbers raised serious issues about a misinformed public and the media's role. He found that a startlingly high percentage falsely believed that Saddam helped plan the 9/11 attacks or Iraqi hijackers were involved that day, and that Iraqi WMD had already been found.
An excerpt is reprinted below.
*
When the war dies down, editors and media analysts should catch their breath and ask themselves: How much did press coverage (or lack of coverage) contribute to the public backing for a pre-emptive invasion without the support of the United Nations?
When it came down to crunch time, the American people — as evidenced by opinion polls conducted after President Bush's ultimatum to Saddam on March 17 — supported the attack by about a 2-to-1 margin. Some of this reflected the usual rallying 'round the flag that accompanies every war, but the truth is, Bush always had strong (if nervous) popular support.
So, what motivated Americans to back their president throughout the winter of discontent — when much of the rest of the world strongly disagreed with the need for war now?
Of course, there were many reasons, ranging from partisan politics to genuine hatred and fear of the evil Saddam. But there was another key factor: Somehow, despite the media's exhaustive coverage of the post-9/11 world and the Saddam threat, a very large segment of the American public remained un- or misinformed about key issues related to the Iraqi crisis. Let's look at a few recent polls.
In a Jan. 7 Knight Ridder/Princeton Research poll, 44% of respondents said they thought "most" or "some" of the Sept. 11, 2001, hijackers were Iraqi citizens. Only 17% of those polled offered the correct answer: none. This was remarkable in light of the fact that, in the weeks after 9/11, few Americans identified Iraqis among the culprits. So the level of awareness on this issue actually plunged as time passed. Is it possible the media failed to give this appropriate attention?
In the same sample, 41% said that Iraq already possessed nuclear weapons, which not even the Bush administration claimed. Despite being far off base in crucial areas, 66% of respondents claimed to have a "good understanding" of the arguments for and against going to war with Iraq.
Then, a Pew Research Center/Council on Foreign Relations survey released Feb. 20 found that nearly two-thirds of those polled believed that U.N. weapons inspectors had "found proof that Iraq is trying to hide weapons of mass destruction." Neither Hans Blix nor Mohamed ElBaradei ever said they found proof of this.
The same survey found that 57% of those polled believed Saddam Hussein helped terrorists involved with the 9/11 attacks, a claim the Bush team had abandoned. A March 7-9 New York Times/CBS News Poll showed that 45% of interviewees agreed that "Saddam Hussein was personally involved in the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks," and a March 14-15 CNN/USA Today/ Gallup poll found this apparently mistaken notion holding firm at 51%.
The significance of this is suggested by the finding, in the same survey, that 32% of those supporting an attack cited Saddam's alleged involvement in supporting terrorists as the "main reason" for endorsing invasion. Another 43% said it was "one reason."
Knowing this was a crucial element of his support — even though he could not prove the 9/11 connection — the president nevertheless tried to bolster the link. Bush mentioned 9/11 eight times during his March 6 prime-time news conference, linking it with Saddam Hussein "often in the same breath," Linda Feldmann of The Christian Science Monitor observed last week. "Bush never pinned the blame for the [9/11] attacks directly on the Iraqi president," Feldmann wrote. "Still, the overall effect was to reinforce an impression that persists among much of the American public."
Carroll Doherty, editor of the Pew Research Center, told me last week: "It's very rare to find a perception that's been so disputed by experts yet firmly held by the public. There's almost nothing the public doesn't believe about Saddam Hussein."
The question, again, is: Did the press do a solid enough job in informing the public about the key contested issues?
"If the U.S. war against Iraq goes well, then the Bush administration is likely not to face questions about the way it sold the war," Feldmann conceded. "But if war and its aftermath go badly, then the administration could be under fire." Newspapers could be, too.
*
E&P Editor Greg Mitchell's new book, "So Wrong for So Long: How the Press, the Pundits -- and the President -- Failed on Iraq," explores public opinion and the media in-depth. To learn more, go to blog
E&P Staff (MailScanner has detected a possible fraud attempt from "www.mediainfo.com" claiming to be gmitchell@editorandpublisher.com)
Links referenced within this article
blog
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[The Lyon of Babylon]
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اوروكنت.إنفو
informazione dall'iraq occupato
information from occupied iraq
أخبار من العراق المحتل
Thanks To The Iraqi War Syria Has A Booming Sex Trade
Moments In Time
image2445940g.jpg
March 25,2008
Wealthy Middle Easterners looking for sex now travel to Syria for a cheap thrill. They have their choice of girls, some as young as 13 thanks to the Iraqi War. Syria has taken in 1.2 million refugees since George Bush ordered the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
With no legal work available an estimated 50,000 female Iraqi refugees are now prostitutes in Syria.
"70 percent to 80 percent of the girls working this business in Damascus today are Iraqis," 23-year-old Abeer told the New York Times. "The rents here in Syria are too expensive for their families. If they go back to Iraq they’ll be slaughtered, and this is the only work available."
Because the United States invaded a country that posed no threat to the United States could George Bush and the country as a whole be blamed for these women’s new jobs? Many citizen tribunals have already convicted President Bush for war crimes. What’s one more crime on the list?
These women fled to Syria as United States troops invaded their homeland. The war was too dangerous for them to stay in Iraq with husbands and fathers were dead. There was no protection in their homeland. The reality though in Syria was thousands of refugees and very little jobs for single women. Except for one.
50,000 Iraqi refugees have been forced into prostitution to survive. Legal work has been banned for those who became refugees as the war in Iraq forced them out. For many sex work is the only possible way to feed their families. It’s a job where in one night they can earn about $60, the same as working in a factory……for a month.
Some of the women working these clubs are as young as 13. Do they have a choice? It is often a trade off of morals and dignity to feed and house a family.
Five years ago the war started. Not all the victims of this war live in Iraq. Not all the mourners live in the United States. Millions have no home. Millions have lost their dignity. And about 50,000 women now provide for their families on their back.
:: Article nr. 42397 sent on 26-mar-2008 01:54 ECT
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Link: timeinmoments.wordpress.com/2008/03/25/op-ed-thanks-to-the-iraqi-war-syria-has-a
-booming-sex-trade/
:: The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Uruknet .
The Manila Times
Opinion
Wednesday, March 26, 2008
Many Iraqi women say life
was better under Saddam
By Nafia Abdul Jabbar and Marwa Sabah, Agence France-Presse
BAGHDAD: Iraqi women say they are now worse off than they were during the rule of dictator Saddam Hussein and that their plight has deteriorated year by year since the US-led invasion in March 2003.
Now they are demanding not just equal rights but the very “right to live,” says Shameran Marugi, head of the non-governmental organisation Iraqi Women’s Committee.
“The ‘right to live’ is a slogan that we have begun using because a women’s life in Iraq is being threatened on all sides. Laws are not being implemented equally and society is ignoring women,” Maguri told AFP.
“Before the 2003 invasion it was possible for a woman to lead a normal life as long as she followed state policy,” she said.
“It was even possible for a woman to engage in political and economic activities through the official Union of Iraqi Women.
“When the regime change occurred in 2003, women, men, and children went out on to the streets to celebrate. We were very happy,” she said.
“Unfortunately there was no qualified leadership to handle the situation and society was not equipped to deal with the changes.”
The Union of Iraqi Women was dismantled after the invasion as it was affiliated to the former Baath Party of Saddam.
In the past few years, Marugi said, violence against women has increased significantly.
“At home a woman faces violence from her father, husband, brother and even from her son. It has become a kind of a new culture in the society,” said the women’s rights campaigner.
Out in society, women are subjected to verbal abuse on the streets if they are not wearing a hijab and in extreme cases face being abducted by unknown gunmen, who sexually abuse and then kill them.
“It has also become normal for women to receive death threats for working for example as a hairdresser or a tailor, for not wearing a hijab or not dressing ‘decently’,” said Marugi, adding: “In addition to equal rights we are now demanding the ‘right to live’.”
Although there are no official nationwide figures available, rights activists report numerous cases of so-called “honour killings” in the southern city of Basra, in the northern Kurdish area and in the capital Baghdad.
A United Nations report said police in Basra registered 44 cases in 2007 where women were killed with multiple gunshot wounds after being accused of committing “honour crimes”.
In Baghdad, the report said, several women teachers have been shot dead by armed men, some of them in front of their students.
A report by the US-based Women For Women International released earlier this month said the state of Iraqi women has become a “national crisis” since the March 2003 US-led invasion.
“Present-day Iraq is plagued by insecurity, a lack of infrastructure and controversial leadership, transforming the situation for women from one of relative autonomy and security before the war into a national crisis,” said the report.
It said 64 percent of the women surveyed complained that violence against them had increased.
“When asked why, respondents most commonly said that there is less respect for women’s rights than before, that women are thought of as possessions, and that the economy has gotten worse,” it said.
The report also found that 76 percent of the women interviewed said that girls in their families were forbidden from attending school.
Selma Jabu, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani’s consultant for women’s affairs, said apart from being sidelined politically Iraqi women are subjected to abuse and intimidation on the streets and face violent sexual abuse.
“There is terrorist violence, including bombs, against the Iraqi people in general on the streets. But there is specific violence against women who are being abducted for sex and subjected to many other crimes,” Jabu said.
“The Iraqi constitution protects and supports women on some issues, but there are other issues we have not agreed upon and we are doing our best to get them in to the constitution,” she said.
Iqbal Ali, in her forties, said death threats had forced her to close her hairdressing salon in Baghdad’s central Karada neighbourhood.
“In the beginning everything was going all right but afterwards the situation in the country deteriorated, women hairdressers started getting threats. My work was affected and I closed my salon down.”
She has now opened a cosmetics and perfume shop which she has named Alwarda Albaidaa (white rose).
“I was in a difficult situation financially with no access to rations, no assistance from the government. I was without a job. So I decided to borrow money and open this shop,” she added.
Suad Mohammed, an employee in Adhamiyah municipality in northwestern Baghdad, carries a pistol in her handbag.
“As an Iraqi woman I don’t think it is safe for me to step out of my house freely. So whenever I go out I carry a weapon with me to defend myself,” said Mohammed.
She said that last year she had gone to a bank to pick up the salary of an old woman who was unable to get there herself, and on the way back the taxi driver turned off and began driving towards the sprawling Shiite neighbourhood of Sadr City.
“He refused to stop and I started screaming. And then I remembered I was carrying a weapon, so I decided to defend myself. The only thing I was thinking about was the woman’s salary.
“I pulled my weapon from my purse and hit him on his neck and hands. He started bleeding but still did not stop. Finally, the taxi was stopped by a passing military convoy and the driver was taken away.”
Since then, said Mohammed, “every time I leave my neighbourhood I make sure I carry my weapon”.
Editor and Publisher
5 Years Later: Pundits Who Were Wrong on Iraq Are Silent
To choose just one example: David Brooks. Exactly five years ago, on the verge of war, he even attacked his current employer, The New York Times, for calling for "still more discussion" before attacking Iraq.
(March 25, 2008) -- Given the current tragedy in Iraq--hell, given the past five years--you would think the many pundits who agitated for an attack on that country, largely on false pretenses, would have take the opportunity of the arrival of the fifth anniversary of the war (or the 4000 dead milestone) to drop to their knees, at least in print, and beg the American public for forgiveness.
With more than 60 percent of their fellow Americans now calling the war a "mistake" and agitating for troop withdrawals--and the president's approval rating still heading south, thanks to their war--it would seem to be the right thing to do. We won't even mention the maiming of more than 20,000 young Americans and tens of thousands of Iraqis.
You can probably name your favorite candidate. Let's take David Brooks of The New York Times, for example, and what he wrote exactly five years ago. He hasn't bothered to revisit his errors in judgement lately. At least Richard Cohen, another favorite whipping boy of antiwar critics, has accepted responsibility for some of his lapses.
Brooks is among those who have long argued that they actually got the war right, but Donald Rumsfeld made it wrong. In other words, war good, Rummy bad. He has emphasized that he and many of his fellow pundits had it right at the time in urging more boots on the ground. They were "prescient," he relates. But Rumsfeld and his crowd "got things wrong, and the pundits often got things right."
He never cites any of his own views at the time, obviously hoping that readers will place him among those pundits that "got things right." And also: please forget that he was a strong supporter of the invasion to start with.
In fact, he bears special blame -- or shame, if you will -- not only for his writing, but for serving as senior editor of the most influential (inside the White House) pro-war publication, The Weekly Standard, headed by Bill Kristol, who has been even more consistently wrong on the war, yet rewarded with a prestigious New York Times slot.
Come to think of it, Brooks got the same reward -- two for the price of two!
Brooks may want you to forget what he wrote five years ago, but here's a trip down memory lane with Our Mr. Brooks.
From his column in The Weekly Standard, March 10, 2003:
"The American commentariat is gravely concerned. Over the past week, George W. Bush has shown a disturbing tendency not to waffle when it comes to Iraq. There has been an appalling clarity and coherence to his position. There has been a reckless tendency not to be murky, hesitant, or evasive. Naturally, questions are being raised about President Bush's leadership skills.
"Meanwhile, among the smart set, Hamlet-like indecision has become the intellectual fashion. The liberal columnist E. J. Dionne wrote in The Washington Post that he is uncomfortable with the pro- and anti-war camps. He praised the doubters and raised his colors on behalf of 'heroic ambivalence.' The New York Times, venturing deep into the territory of self-parody, ran a full-page editorial calling for 'still more discussion' on whether or not to go to war.
"In certain circles, it is not only important what opinion you hold, but how you hold it. It is important to be seen dancing with complexity, sliding among shades of gray. Any poor rube can come to a simple conclusion--that President Saddam Hussein is a menace who must be disarmed--but the refined ratiocinators want to be seen luxuriating amid the difficulties, donning the jewels of nuance, even to the point of self-paralysis.
"But those who actually have to lead and protect, and actually have to build one step on another, have to bring some questions to a close. Bush gave Saddam time to disarm. Saddam did not. Hence, the issue of whether to disarm him forcibly is settled. The French and the Germans and the domestic critics may keep debating, which is their luxury, but the people who actually make the decisions have moved on to more practical concerns. . . ."
From his Weekly Standard column two weeks later:
"The president has remained resolute. Momentum to liberate Iraq continues to build. The situation has clarified, and history will allow clear judgments about which leaders and which institutions were up to the challenge posed by Saddam and which were not.
"Over the past 12 years the United States has sought to disarm or depose Saddam--more forcefully since September 11 than before. Throughout that time, France and Russia have sought to undermine sanctions and fend off the ousting of Saddam. They opposed Clinton's efforts to bomb Saddam, just as they oppose Bush's push for regime change. Through the fog and verbiage, that is the essential confrontation. Events will show who was right, George W. Bush or Jacques Chirac.
"What matters, and what ultimately sprang the U.N. trap, is American resolve. The administration simply wouldn't let up. It didn't matter how Hans Blix muddied the waters with his reports on this or that weapons system. Under the U.N. resolutions, it was up to Saddam to disarm, administration officials repeated ad nauseam, and he wasn't doing it. It was and is sheer relentlessness that has driven us to where we are today.
"Which is ironic. We are in this situation because the first Bush administration was not relentless in its pursuit of Saddam Hussein. That is a mistake this Bush administration will not repeat."
*
Greg Mitchell's new book is "So Wrong for So Long: How the Press, the Pundits -- and the President -- Failed on Iraq." It features a foreword by Joe Galloway and preface by Bruce Springteen.
Editor and Publisher
5 Years Ago: Why Was Public So Misinformed on Facts Leading to War?
By E&P Staff
Published: March 23, 2008 11:10 AM ET
NEW YORK Five years ago today, as the U.S invasion of Iraq continued in its early stages, E&P published an article by Ari Berman, then an intern here, that examined the public attitudes on the eve of the war. He probed polls that found, on the most basic point, that roughly 2 out of 3 Americans backed an assault on Iraq.
But the attitudes driving those numbers raised serious issues about a misinformed public and the media's role. He found that a startlingly high percentage falsely believed that Saddam helped plan the 9/11 attacks or Iraqi hijackers were involved that day, and that Iraqi WMD had already been found.
An excerpt is reprinted below.
*
When the war dies down, editors and media analysts should catch their breath and ask themselves: How much did press coverage (or lack of coverage) contribute to the public backing for a pre-emptive invasion without the support of the United Nations?
When it came down to crunch time, the American people — as evidenced by opinion polls conducted after President Bush's ultimatum to Saddam on March 17 — supported the attack by about a 2-to-1 margin. Some of this reflected the usual rallying 'round the flag that accompanies every war, but the truth is, Bush always had strong (if nervous) popular support.
So, what motivated Americans to back their president throughout the winter of discontent — when much of the rest of the world strongly disagreed with the need for war now?
Of course, there were many reasons, ranging from partisan politics to genuine hatred and fear of the evil Saddam. But there was another key factor: Somehow, despite the media's exhaustive coverage of the post-9/11 world and the Saddam threat, a very large segment of the American public remained un- or misinformed about key issues related to the Iraqi crisis. Let's look at a few recent polls.
In a Jan. 7 Knight Ridder/Princeton Research poll, 44% of respondents said they thought "most" or "some" of the Sept. 11, 2001, hijackers were Iraqi citizens. Only 17% of those polled offered the correct answer: none. This was remarkable in light of the fact that, in the weeks after 9/11, few Americans identified Iraqis among the culprits. So the level of awareness on this issue actually plunged as time passed. Is it possible the media failed to give this appropriate attention?
In the same sample, 41% said that Iraq already possessed nuclear weapons, which not even the Bush administration claimed. Despite being far off base in crucial areas, 66% of respondents claimed to have a "good understanding" of the arguments for and against going to war with Iraq.
Then, a Pew Research Center/Council on Foreign Relations survey released Feb. 20 found that nearly two-thirds of those polled believed that U.N. weapons inspectors had "found proof that Iraq is trying to hide weapons of mass destruction." Neither Hans Blix nor Mohamed ElBaradei ever said they found proof of this.
The same survey found that 57% of those polled believed Saddam Hussein helped terrorists involved with the 9/11 attacks, a claim the Bush team had abandoned. A March 7-9 New York Times/CBS News Poll showed that 45% of interviewees agreed that "Saddam Hussein was personally involved in the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks," and a March 14-15 CNN/USA Today/ Gallup poll found this apparently mistaken notion holding firm at 51%.
The significance of this is suggested by the finding, in the same survey, that 32% of those supporting an attack cited Saddam's alleged involvement in supporting terrorists as the "main reason" for endorsing invasion. Another 43% said it was "one reason."
Knowing this was a crucial element of his support — even though he could not prove the 9/11 connection — the president nevertheless tried to bolster the link. Bush mentioned 9/11 eight times during his March 6 prime-time news conference, linking it with Saddam Hussein "often in the same breath," Linda Feldmann of The Christian Science Monitor observed last week. "Bush never pinned the blame for the [9/11] attacks directly on the Iraqi president," Feldmann wrote. "Still, the overall effect was to reinforce an impression that persists among much of the American public."
Carroll Doherty, editor of the Pew Research Center, told me last week: "It's very rare to find a perception that's been so disputed by experts yet firmly held by the public. There's almost nothing the public doesn't believe about Saddam Hussein."
The question, again, is: Did the press do a solid enough job in informing the public about the key contested issues?
"If the U.S. war against Iraq goes well, then the Bush administration is likely not to face questions about the way it sold the war," Feldmann conceded. "But if war and its aftermath go badly, then the administration could be under fire." Newspapers could be, too.
*
E&P Editor Greg Mitchell's new book, "So Wrong for So Long: How the Press, the Pundits -- and the President -- Failed on Iraq," explores public opinion and the media in-depth. To learn more, go to blog
E&P Staff (MailScanner has detected a possible fraud attempt from "www.mediainfo.com" claiming to be gmitchell@editorandpublisher.com)
Links referenced within this article
blog
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[The Lyon of Babylon]
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اوروكنت.إنفو
informazione dall'iraq occupato
information from occupied iraq
أخبار من العراق المحتل
Thanks To The Iraqi War Syria Has A Booming Sex Trade
Moments In Time
image2445940g.jpg
March 25,2008
Wealthy Middle Easterners looking for sex now travel to Syria for a cheap thrill. They have their choice of girls, some as young as 13 thanks to the Iraqi War. Syria has taken in 1.2 million refugees since George Bush ordered the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
With no legal work available an estimated 50,000 female Iraqi refugees are now prostitutes in Syria.
"70 percent to 80 percent of the girls working this business in Damascus today are Iraqis," 23-year-old Abeer told the New York Times. "The rents here in Syria are too expensive for their families. If they go back to Iraq they’ll be slaughtered, and this is the only work available."
Because the United States invaded a country that posed no threat to the United States could George Bush and the country as a whole be blamed for these women’s new jobs? Many citizen tribunals have already convicted President Bush for war crimes. What’s one more crime on the list?
These women fled to Syria as United States troops invaded their homeland. The war was too dangerous for them to stay in Iraq with husbands and fathers were dead. There was no protection in their homeland. The reality though in Syria was thousands of refugees and very little jobs for single women. Except for one.
50,000 Iraqi refugees have been forced into prostitution to survive. Legal work has been banned for those who became refugees as the war in Iraq forced them out. For many sex work is the only possible way to feed their families. It’s a job where in one night they can earn about $60, the same as working in a factory……for a month.
Some of the women working these clubs are as young as 13. Do they have a choice? It is often a trade off of morals and dignity to feed and house a family.
Five years ago the war started. Not all the victims of this war live in Iraq. Not all the mourners live in the United States. Millions have no home. Millions have lost their dignity. And about 50,000 women now provide for their families on their back.
:: Article nr. 42397 sent on 26-mar-2008 01:54 ECT
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Link: timeinmoments.wordpress.com/2008/03/25/op-ed-thanks-to-the-iraqi-war-syria-has-a
-booming-sex-trade/
:: The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Uruknet .
Many killed in fresh Iraq fighting - WITH MAPS
Many killed in fresh Iraq fighting - WITH MAPS
FOR MAPS, PLEASE VISIT THE FOLLOWING LINKS.
______
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/iraq_pol_2004.jpg
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/basrah_2003.jpg
______
UPDATED ON:
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 26, 2008
10:12 MECCA TIME, 7:12 GMT
Many killed in fresh Iraq fighting
Many towns and cities across southern Iraq were under curfew by nightfall [AFP]
Fighters loyal to Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr have clashed with Iraqi and US forces in their Baghdad bastion of Sadr City and in the southern oil hub of Basra, a day after running battles left many people killed.
Iraqi security officials said that at least 14 people were killed and 100 others wounded on Wednesday in Baghdad's Sadr City.
bodyVariable350="Htmlphcontrol1_lblError";
Nuri al-Maliki, Iraq's prime minister, has imposed a deadline for those fighting security forces in Basra to surrender.
"Those who were deceived into carry weapons must deliver themselves and make a written pledge to promise they will not repeat such action within 72 hours," he said on Wednesday.
bodyVariable300="Htmlphcontrol2_lblError";
"Otherwise, they will face the most severe penalties."
'Disobedience' appeal
Officials said the latest fighting broke out in Sadr City early on Wednesday.
Your Views
What are the reasons for the surge of violence in Iraq?
Send us your views
Clashes were also reported in the Mahdi Army's southern strongholds of Al-Gaazaiza, Al-Garma, Khmasamene, Al-Hayania and Al-Maqal.
Iraq's security forces launched raids on strongholds of Sadr's Mahdi Army fighters on Tuesday.
As the fighting broke out, al-Sadr issued a statement calling for demonstrations across the country and threatened "civil disobedience" if attacks by US and Iraqi forces on members of his movement continued.
"We demand that religious and political leaders intervene to stop the attacks on poor people," a statement read by Hazam al-Aaraji, an al-Sadr representative, said.
"We call on all Iraqis to launch protests across all the provinces. If the government does not respect these demands, the second step will be general civil disobedience in Baghdad and the Iraqi provinces."
James Bays, Al Jazeera's correspondent in Baghdad, said al-Sadr's call was likely to be heeded by his supporters.
"He has a lot of influence and he has a lot of followers. What is not clear is exactly what he is calling for," he said.
"The statement made publicly is a call for civil disobedience [and] not an end to Muqtada al-Sadr's ceasefire. That, apparently, is still oficially in place."
Basra operation
The fighting in Basra, where al-Sadr's followers maintain a strong presence, began before dawn on Tuesday in what the Iraqi government called an operation to win control of the city from militias and criminal gangs.
Nuri al-Maliki, Iraq's prime minister, was in the oil hub city to personally oversee the operation involving thousands of Iraqi troops.
Al-Maliki was personally overseeing the
military operation in Basra [AFP]
Ali al-Dabbagh, an Iraqi government spokesman, told Al Jazeera that the security forces were fighting against "those that are exploiting the name of the Mahdi, those that are exploiting the name of Muqtada al-Sadr".
"There will be no dialogue with them [the fighters] but there definitely will be dialogue with Muqtada al-Sadr himself," he said.
By nightfall, many towns and cities across southern Iraq were under curfew to try to stem spreading violence.
Police sources said supporters of al-Sadr seized control of five neighbourhods in the southern town of Kut after clashing with police.
In Hilla, police battled Mahdi Army fighters in two districts in the centre of the southern town.
'Ceasefire'
The Mahdi Army has grown frustrated with a ceasefire imposed by al-Sadr last year.
Its fighters say has been abused by US and Iraqi forces to make indiscriminate arrests ahead of provincial elections.
The US military says it is targeting only "rogue" members who have broken the ceasefire, and has cited the truce as a main factor in a significant drop in violence across the country.
Sheikh Ahmed al-Ali, a member of al-Sadr's office in Basra, said the group could not understand why Iraqi security forces had launched an operation against it.
"This ongoing operation in Basra appears to be security-related, while, in fact, it is a political one," he told Al Jazeera.
"The al-Sadr trend in Basra has frequently said that it supports the Iraqi government and the Iraqi forces in Basra.
"Al-Mahdi Army is not a military army, as some believe. It is a doctrinal army that serves the society. And that is why al-Mahdi Army has had a great role in supporting the Iraqi security forces in Basra."
Basra province was handed over to Iraqi control by British forces in mid-December and Tuesday's operation was seen as a test for the security forces.
Source: Al Jazeera and agencies
Tuesday, 25 March 2008
At least 7 dead and 48 wounded in Maliki crackdown
Iraq's Sadr threatens revolt after deadly clashes
Iraqi police in the southern oil city of Basra
Basra, IRAQ (Agencies)
Iraq's radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr on Tuesday threatened a countrywide campaign of civil revolt as security forces battled his militiamen in the southern city of Basra.
Fighting raged from early morning in areas of Basra controlled by Sadr's Mahdi Army militia as troops and police launched a major crackdown on armed groups in the oil hub, considered the nerve centre of Iraq's national economy.
At least seven people were killed and 48 wounded, among them dozens of members of the Iraqi security forces, according to police and medical officials.
Fighting also erupted in Baghdad when Mahdi militiamen attacked offices of the rival Badr militia, while in the west of the capital hundreds of Sadr supporters took to the streets to protest the arrests of Mahdi Army members.
An AFP correspondent said fighting in Basra died away late afternoon and the streets were empty even of security force vehicles.
Sadr, in a statement read by his representative Hazam al-Aaraji in the holy city of Najaf, warned he would launch protests and a nationwide strike if attacks against members of his movement and "poor people" are not halted.
"We demand that religious and political leaders intervene to stop the attacks on poor people. We call on all Iraqis to launch protests across all the provinces. If the government does not respect these demands, the second step will be general civil disobedience in Baghdad and the Iraqi provinces."
The cleric in August ordered his militia to observe a ceasefire following bloody fighting in the shrine city of Karbala blamed on his fighters, which were involved in two rebellions against US forces in 2004.
While Iraqi and US officials say most members of the militia have heeded the order, a number of what the US military terms "rogue elements" continue to attack American forces with mortars, rockets and roadside bombs.
Despite the ceasefire, Mahdi Army members are being subject to raids by the "occupiers" and Iraqi forces which are "destroying Iraqi houses," Sadr's statement said.
"Iraqis in general and Mahdi members in particular are paying the price."
British military officials said Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki was in Basra to personally oversee the major security force sweep in Iraq's second largest city, but that British troops were not taking part.
Television pictures showed Iraqi troops running through the streets firing weapons and taking cover as ambulances raced past. Thick palls of smoke were seen rising above the city skyline.
The operation against the militias dubbed Saulat al-Fursan (Charge of the Knights) came after a 10:00 pm to 6:00 am curfew was slapped on the entire Basra province on Monday.
After touring Basra on Monday, Maliki vowed his government would restore order, saying the city was experiencing a "brutal campaign" by internal and external groups targeting "innocent men and women."
"This is accompanied by the smuggling of oil, weapons and drugs... Basra has become a city where civilians cannot even secure their lives and property," Maliki said in a statement.
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Maliki's Moment of Truth in Basra
Posted GMT 3-26-2008 5:52:13
Baghdad -- The massive operation by the Iraqi army in Basra could be a defining battle against Shi'ite militias. Reports from the southern city -- the hub of Iraq's oil industry and gateway to its main ports -- say fierce fighting has broken out between government forces and militias. Eyewitnesses have told TIME of several smoke plumes rising out of the city's northern districts, and the sound of explosions and gunfire. Iraqi TV channels have shown images of helicopters flying over the city, and troops sweeping through some streets. At least 22 people were killed, and 58 wounded, in the fighting.
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki arrived in Basra on Monday, accompanied by his ministers for defense and the interior, to personally supervise the operation. For Maliki, this is a crucial show of force. For much of the past three years, the Iraqi government has had little influence over Basra. As British troops have steadily withdrawn from the city, it has fallen into the control of three major Shi'ite militias -- Moqtada al'Sadr's Mahdi Army, the Iran-backed Badr Brigades and a local group associated with the Fadila Party. The three have recently fought turf battles over large swaths of the city, claiming hundreds of lives.
Although there are over 4,000 British troops at a base outside Basra, they have done little to curb the violence. "We have a capacity to provide air and other specialist support if needed, but at this time British involvement is minimal," a British Ministry of Defense spokesman said, declining to be identified in accordance with department policy. Many Iraqis blame Basra's descent into chaos on flawed British strategy. They contend that in their haste to draw down forces, the British did little to train and bolster the local police force. Instead, many militia fighters were recruited into the police, making the force a part of Basra's problems rather than a solution.
Maliki's government has repeatedly sworn to bring the militias to heel, but this is the first major offensive it has mounted in Basra. Early reports suggest the military drive is targeting the Mahdi Army, which controls much of northern Basra. But Iraqi officials have said Tuesday the operation will continue until all militias have surrendered.
Maliki's government and the Iraqi Army desperately need a big military success. Most of the credit for the reduction in violence across Iraq over the past year has gone to the U.S. military's "surge" strategy, and to the Sunni tribes that switched sides to fight al-Qaeda. The Iraqi security forces have appeared, at best, mere spectators; at worst, they are seen as sectarian militias in uniform. A spectacular win in Basra would help give the army and police some much-needed credibility among ordinary Iraqis.
Failure to impose Baghdad's writ on Basra would have major economic repercussions -- already, the oil pipelines are frequently bombed and large quantities of crude smuggled out. But there's more at stake: While he directs the fighting in Basra, Maliki must also prepare himself for a political backlash in Baghdad. Two of the militias have close ties to the government: Sadr controls a large block of the members of parliament, and the Badr Brigades are the military arm of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, the largest Shi'ite party. If both political blocks withdraw their support for Maliki, that would doom his government.
The Iraqi capital, meanwhile, is bracing for a fallout from the fighting in Basra. Large parts of western Baghdad have been shut down by a strike called by Sadrists. Anticipating violence from the Mahdi Army, the Iraqi Army has increased patrolling in the city and reinforced police checkpoints.
By Bobby Ghosh
www.time.com
© 2008, Assyrian International News Agency. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use.
The Independent
Independent.co.uk
Rebel militia battle for control of Basra
AP
Tuesday, 25 March 2008
Iraqi forces battled with Shia militia today for control of the southern oil port of Basra.
The violence in which at least 20 people died was part of an escalating confrontation between the government and Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr's followers, but British troops now based outside at the city's airport were not involved.
Al Sadr declared a unilateral cease-fire last August which, along with a US troop building and a Sunni alliance with the American forces, has contributed to a steep drop in violence over the past several months.
But the truce frayed as al Sadr's allies grew increasingly angry over US and Iraqi raids and detentions and demanded the release of followers rounded up in recent weeks.
The cleric recently told his followers that although the truce remains in effect, they were free to defend themselves against attacks.
Al Sadr's headquarters in Najaf also ordered field commanders with his Mahdi Army militia to go on maximum alert and prepare "to strike the occupiers" - a term used to describe US forces - and their Iraqi allies.
Politicians from al Sadr's movement announced in a Baghdad press conference that a civil disobedience campaign - which began in selected districts of the capital and included the closure of businesses and schools - was being expanded across the country.
Stores and schools were closed in several other predominantly Shiite neighborhoods in the capital, apparently in compliance with the civil disobedience order. Armed Mahdi Army members were seen patrolling the streets in some Shiite neighborhoods of the capital.
In Basra, until last year controlled by British forces, Iraqi soldiers and police battled Mahdi fighters for control of key districts.
The fighting erupted a day after Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki flew there and announced the security crackdown against the militias.
Basra, Iraq's second-largest city, accounts for most of its oil exports, but an oil ministry official said production and exports had not been affected by the fighting.
Curfews were also imposed in the Shiite cities of Kut, where a large number of Mahdi Army gunmen were seen deploying on the streets, and Nasiriyah.
In Baghdad, suspected Mahdi Army gunmen exchanged gunfire with security guards of the rival Shiite Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council in Sadr City.
The rising tension led many in Shiite neighborhoods to stay at home rather than venture into contested streets.
Security in Basra had been steadily declining well before Britain handed over responsibility for security to the Iraqis on December 16.
British troops remained at their base at the airport outside Basra and were not involved in the ground fighting.
Last month, a British journalist working for CBS and his Iraqi interpreter were kidnapped from a hotel. The Iraqi was released after al-Sadr's office negotiated a deal, but the Briton remains in custody.
In other violence, two bombs exploded in central Baghdad, killing one civilian and wounding eight others, and a US-allied Sunni fighter also was killed in a drive-by shooting north-east of the capital, police said.
FOR MAPS, PLEASE VISIT THE FOLLOWING LINKS.
______
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/iraq_pol_2004.jpg
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/basrah_2003.jpg
______
UPDATED ON:
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 26, 2008
10:12 MECCA TIME, 7:12 GMT
Many killed in fresh Iraq fighting
Many towns and cities across southern Iraq were under curfew by nightfall [AFP]
Fighters loyal to Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr have clashed with Iraqi and US forces in their Baghdad bastion of Sadr City and in the southern oil hub of Basra, a day after running battles left many people killed.
Iraqi security officials said that at least 14 people were killed and 100 others wounded on Wednesday in Baghdad's Sadr City.
bodyVariable350="Htmlphcontrol1_lblError";
Nuri al-Maliki, Iraq's prime minister, has imposed a deadline for those fighting security forces in Basra to surrender.
"Those who were deceived into carry weapons must deliver themselves and make a written pledge to promise they will not repeat such action within 72 hours," he said on Wednesday.
bodyVariable300="Htmlphcontrol2_lblError";
"Otherwise, they will face the most severe penalties."
'Disobedience' appeal
Officials said the latest fighting broke out in Sadr City early on Wednesday.
Your Views
What are the reasons for the surge of violence in Iraq?
Send us your views
Clashes were also reported in the Mahdi Army's southern strongholds of Al-Gaazaiza, Al-Garma, Khmasamene, Al-Hayania and Al-Maqal.
Iraq's security forces launched raids on strongholds of Sadr's Mahdi Army fighters on Tuesday.
As the fighting broke out, al-Sadr issued a statement calling for demonstrations across the country and threatened "civil disobedience" if attacks by US and Iraqi forces on members of his movement continued.
"We demand that religious and political leaders intervene to stop the attacks on poor people," a statement read by Hazam al-Aaraji, an al-Sadr representative, said.
"We call on all Iraqis to launch protests across all the provinces. If the government does not respect these demands, the second step will be general civil disobedience in Baghdad and the Iraqi provinces."
James Bays, Al Jazeera's correspondent in Baghdad, said al-Sadr's call was likely to be heeded by his supporters.
"He has a lot of influence and he has a lot of followers. What is not clear is exactly what he is calling for," he said.
"The statement made publicly is a call for civil disobedience [and] not an end to Muqtada al-Sadr's ceasefire. That, apparently, is still oficially in place."
Basra operation
The fighting in Basra, where al-Sadr's followers maintain a strong presence, began before dawn on Tuesday in what the Iraqi government called an operation to win control of the city from militias and criminal gangs.
Nuri al-Maliki, Iraq's prime minister, was in the oil hub city to personally oversee the operation involving thousands of Iraqi troops.
Al-Maliki was personally overseeing the
military operation in Basra [AFP]
Ali al-Dabbagh, an Iraqi government spokesman, told Al Jazeera that the security forces were fighting against "those that are exploiting the name of the Mahdi, those that are exploiting the name of Muqtada al-Sadr".
"There will be no dialogue with them [the fighters] but there definitely will be dialogue with Muqtada al-Sadr himself," he said.
By nightfall, many towns and cities across southern Iraq were under curfew to try to stem spreading violence.
Police sources said supporters of al-Sadr seized control of five neighbourhods in the southern town of Kut after clashing with police.
In Hilla, police battled Mahdi Army fighters in two districts in the centre of the southern town.
'Ceasefire'
The Mahdi Army has grown frustrated with a ceasefire imposed by al-Sadr last year.
Its fighters say has been abused by US and Iraqi forces to make indiscriminate arrests ahead of provincial elections.
The US military says it is targeting only "rogue" members who have broken the ceasefire, and has cited the truce as a main factor in a significant drop in violence across the country.
Sheikh Ahmed al-Ali, a member of al-Sadr's office in Basra, said the group could not understand why Iraqi security forces had launched an operation against it.
"This ongoing operation in Basra appears to be security-related, while, in fact, it is a political one," he told Al Jazeera.
"The al-Sadr trend in Basra has frequently said that it supports the Iraqi government and the Iraqi forces in Basra.
"Al-Mahdi Army is not a military army, as some believe. It is a doctrinal army that serves the society. And that is why al-Mahdi Army has had a great role in supporting the Iraqi security forces in Basra."
Basra province was handed over to Iraqi control by British forces in mid-December and Tuesday's operation was seen as a test for the security forces.
Source: Al Jazeera and agencies
Tuesday, 25 March 2008
At least 7 dead and 48 wounded in Maliki crackdown
Iraq's Sadr threatens revolt after deadly clashes
Iraqi police in the southern oil city of Basra
Basra, IRAQ (Agencies)
Iraq's radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr on Tuesday threatened a countrywide campaign of civil revolt as security forces battled his militiamen in the southern city of Basra.
Fighting raged from early morning in areas of Basra controlled by Sadr's Mahdi Army militia as troops and police launched a major crackdown on armed groups in the oil hub, considered the nerve centre of Iraq's national economy.
At least seven people were killed and 48 wounded, among them dozens of members of the Iraqi security forces, according to police and medical officials.
Fighting also erupted in Baghdad when Mahdi militiamen attacked offices of the rival Badr militia, while in the west of the capital hundreds of Sadr supporters took to the streets to protest the arrests of Mahdi Army members.
An AFP correspondent said fighting in Basra died away late afternoon and the streets were empty even of security force vehicles.
Sadr, in a statement read by his representative Hazam al-Aaraji in the holy city of Najaf, warned he would launch protests and a nationwide strike if attacks against members of his movement and "poor people" are not halted.
"We demand that religious and political leaders intervene to stop the attacks on poor people. We call on all Iraqis to launch protests across all the provinces. If the government does not respect these demands, the second step will be general civil disobedience in Baghdad and the Iraqi provinces."
The cleric in August ordered his militia to observe a ceasefire following bloody fighting in the shrine city of Karbala blamed on his fighters, which were involved in two rebellions against US forces in 2004.
While Iraqi and US officials say most members of the militia have heeded the order, a number of what the US military terms "rogue elements" continue to attack American forces with mortars, rockets and roadside bombs.
Despite the ceasefire, Mahdi Army members are being subject to raids by the "occupiers" and Iraqi forces which are "destroying Iraqi houses," Sadr's statement said.
"Iraqis in general and Mahdi members in particular are paying the price."
British military officials said Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki was in Basra to personally oversee the major security force sweep in Iraq's second largest city, but that British troops were not taking part.
Television pictures showed Iraqi troops running through the streets firing weapons and taking cover as ambulances raced past. Thick palls of smoke were seen rising above the city skyline.
The operation against the militias dubbed Saulat al-Fursan (Charge of the Knights) came after a 10:00 pm to 6:00 am curfew was slapped on the entire Basra province on Monday.
After touring Basra on Monday, Maliki vowed his government would restore order, saying the city was experiencing a "brutal campaign" by internal and external groups targeting "innocent men and women."
"This is accompanied by the smuggling of oil, weapons and drugs... Basra has become a city where civilians cannot even secure their lives and property," Maliki said in a statement.
All rights reserved for Alarabiya.net © 2006-2007
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Maliki's Moment of Truth in Basra
Posted GMT 3-26-2008 5:52:13
Baghdad -- The massive operation by the Iraqi army in Basra could be a defining battle against Shi'ite militias. Reports from the southern city -- the hub of Iraq's oil industry and gateway to its main ports -- say fierce fighting has broken out between government forces and militias. Eyewitnesses have told TIME of several smoke plumes rising out of the city's northern districts, and the sound of explosions and gunfire. Iraqi TV channels have shown images of helicopters flying over the city, and troops sweeping through some streets. At least 22 people were killed, and 58 wounded, in the fighting.
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki arrived in Basra on Monday, accompanied by his ministers for defense and the interior, to personally supervise the operation. For Maliki, this is a crucial show of force. For much of the past three years, the Iraqi government has had little influence over Basra. As British troops have steadily withdrawn from the city, it has fallen into the control of three major Shi'ite militias -- Moqtada al'Sadr's Mahdi Army, the Iran-backed Badr Brigades and a local group associated with the Fadila Party. The three have recently fought turf battles over large swaths of the city, claiming hundreds of lives.
Although there are over 4,000 British troops at a base outside Basra, they have done little to curb the violence. "We have a capacity to provide air and other specialist support if needed, but at this time British involvement is minimal," a British Ministry of Defense spokesman said, declining to be identified in accordance with department policy. Many Iraqis blame Basra's descent into chaos on flawed British strategy. They contend that in their haste to draw down forces, the British did little to train and bolster the local police force. Instead, many militia fighters were recruited into the police, making the force a part of Basra's problems rather than a solution.
Maliki's government has repeatedly sworn to bring the militias to heel, but this is the first major offensive it has mounted in Basra. Early reports suggest the military drive is targeting the Mahdi Army, which controls much of northern Basra. But Iraqi officials have said Tuesday the operation will continue until all militias have surrendered.
Maliki's government and the Iraqi Army desperately need a big military success. Most of the credit for the reduction in violence across Iraq over the past year has gone to the U.S. military's "surge" strategy, and to the Sunni tribes that switched sides to fight al-Qaeda. The Iraqi security forces have appeared, at best, mere spectators; at worst, they are seen as sectarian militias in uniform. A spectacular win in Basra would help give the army and police some much-needed credibility among ordinary Iraqis.
Failure to impose Baghdad's writ on Basra would have major economic repercussions -- already, the oil pipelines are frequently bombed and large quantities of crude smuggled out. But there's more at stake: While he directs the fighting in Basra, Maliki must also prepare himself for a political backlash in Baghdad. Two of the militias have close ties to the government: Sadr controls a large block of the members of parliament, and the Badr Brigades are the military arm of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, the largest Shi'ite party. If both political blocks withdraw their support for Maliki, that would doom his government.
The Iraqi capital, meanwhile, is bracing for a fallout from the fighting in Basra. Large parts of western Baghdad have been shut down by a strike called by Sadrists. Anticipating violence from the Mahdi Army, the Iraqi Army has increased patrolling in the city and reinforced police checkpoints.
By Bobby Ghosh
www.time.com
© 2008, Assyrian International News Agency. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use.
The Independent
Independent.co.uk
Rebel militia battle for control of Basra
AP
Tuesday, 25 March 2008
Iraqi forces battled with Shia militia today for control of the southern oil port of Basra.
The violence in which at least 20 people died was part of an escalating confrontation between the government and Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr's followers, but British troops now based outside at the city's airport were not involved.
Al Sadr declared a unilateral cease-fire last August which, along with a US troop building and a Sunni alliance with the American forces, has contributed to a steep drop in violence over the past several months.
But the truce frayed as al Sadr's allies grew increasingly angry over US and Iraqi raids and detentions and demanded the release of followers rounded up in recent weeks.
The cleric recently told his followers that although the truce remains in effect, they were free to defend themselves against attacks.
Al Sadr's headquarters in Najaf also ordered field commanders with his Mahdi Army militia to go on maximum alert and prepare "to strike the occupiers" - a term used to describe US forces - and their Iraqi allies.
Politicians from al Sadr's movement announced in a Baghdad press conference that a civil disobedience campaign - which began in selected districts of the capital and included the closure of businesses and schools - was being expanded across the country.
Stores and schools were closed in several other predominantly Shiite neighborhoods in the capital, apparently in compliance with the civil disobedience order. Armed Mahdi Army members were seen patrolling the streets in some Shiite neighborhoods of the capital.
In Basra, until last year controlled by British forces, Iraqi soldiers and police battled Mahdi fighters for control of key districts.
The fighting erupted a day after Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki flew there and announced the security crackdown against the militias.
Basra, Iraq's second-largest city, accounts for most of its oil exports, but an oil ministry official said production and exports had not been affected by the fighting.
Curfews were also imposed in the Shiite cities of Kut, where a large number of Mahdi Army gunmen were seen deploying on the streets, and Nasiriyah.
In Baghdad, suspected Mahdi Army gunmen exchanged gunfire with security guards of the rival Shiite Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council in Sadr City.
The rising tension led many in Shiite neighborhoods to stay at home rather than venture into contested streets.
Security in Basra had been steadily declining well before Britain handed over responsibility for security to the Iraqis on December 16.
British troops remained at their base at the airport outside Basra and were not involved in the ground fighting.
Last month, a British journalist working for CBS and his Iraqi interpreter were kidnapped from a hotel. The Iraqi was released after al-Sadr's office negotiated a deal, but the Briton remains in custody.
In other violence, two bombs exploded in central Baghdad, killing one civilian and wounding eight others, and a US-allied Sunni fighter also was killed in a drive-by shooting north-east of the capital, police said.
The Threat of a Re-Surge in Iraq - Moqtada al-Sadr
The Threat of a Re-Surge in Iraq - Moqtada al-Sadr
telegraph.co.uk
Basra is the test
Last Updated: 12:01am GMT 26/03/2008
The military offensive launched Tuesday in Basra by Nouri al-Maliki, the Iraqi prime minister, to "cleanse" the city of militiamen loyal to the rabble-rousing Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr needs to succeed. It is the first serious test of the ability of the Iraqi army to impose order unaided (other than with air support) by allied forces.
Training and equipping the Iraqi military to a level that allows them to maintain internal security has been a prime objective of the post-invasion strategy. If the operation in Basra works, it will be something of a landmark in a process of post-war reconstruction that has proved painfully difficult.
The near-anarchy that is now being tackled in Basra will add weight to the criticism that American commanders have levelled at the British for withdrawing from the city to the nearby airbase, where they have taken up a non-combatant, overwatch role.
The Americans complain that just as their aggressive surge strategy was beginning to pay dividends in Baghdad and the level of violence was falling, Britain was pursuing the opposite strategy, with wholly predictable consequences. In fact, the real roots of the unrest in Iraq's southern city run much deeper.
As Sir Hilary Synnott, the British diplomat sent in to run southern Iraq after the invasion, has pointed out, there was a "complete absence" of any post-war plan, a fact confirmed at the weekend by Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair's former chief of staff. Gordon Brown has already conceded in principle that this failure should be the subject of a full inquiry; we see no grounds for delaying such a move.
The danger now is that the assault against Sadr's Mahdi army will prompt unrest elsewhere - the Shia cities of Kut, Nasiriyah and Samawa were all put under curfew Tuesday.
If the Basra operation is the first real test of the Iraqi army's credibility, there will surely be many more in the months and years to come before the coalition forces can contemplate complete withdrawal. Yet if there can be no swift exit, success in Basra will at least offer the prospect of a glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel.
Monday, Mar. 24, 2008
The Threat of a Re-Surge in Iraq
By Darrin Mortenson
General David Petraeus
General David Petraeus is due to report to Congress on the progress of the surge on April 8 and 9
Could Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's attempts to re-establish control over Basra backfire? There is a growing possibility that it could become a wider intra-Shi'ite war, drawing in the forces loyal to radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, whose ceasefire has been key to the success of the U.S. "surge"? If so, the consequences for American military strategy in Iraq in an all-important political year will be grave.
Maliki's government targeted Basra because it could. Unlike many other southern cities where fighting has escalated in recent weeks, Maliki has built an independent power base among the security forces there. But Tuesday's sweep of Basra could turn sour in other southern cities where the central government's power is weak. Indeed, many Shi'ites are seeing this not just as an example of the Shi'ite Maliki taking on other Shi'ites (including Sadrists) but of America backing the Prime Minister up in a de facto Shi'a civil war. Iraqi government forces have attacked Shi'ite militias and gangs in at least seven major southern Iraq cities in the past two weeks. And America has been there to support Maliki's troops every time.
In response, Sadr loyalists have already taken to the streets in Baghdad, where U.S. troops will have to deal with the backlash. U.S. officials have so far shied away from blaming Sadr for the recent rise of violence (including an Easter attack on the Green Zone), mostly because Sadr's ceasefire has been key to the success of the surge. (General David Petraeus has pointed the finger at Iran instead.) But as clashes increase, they may not be able to dance around it for much longer.
The violence is escalating as Patraeus, the architect of the nine-month military "surge" involving some 30,000 extra troops in Iraq, prepares for a scheduled Apr. 8 and 9 report to congress on his progress in Iraq. They also come as he and Defense Secretary Robert Gates waffle over whether to withdraw five combat brigades by July, reducing troop levels down from about 158,000 to 140,000 — the pre-surge peak. If the fighting spreads to other southern cities and attacks by Shi'ite militias increase, intra-Shiite violence may be the wrench that jams the whole works of a meaningful reduction of troops.
While the focus this weekend on attacks on Baghdad has now turned towards Basra, violence has surged for weeks throughout the Shi'ite south, where Americans have suffered fresh losses in old haunts in the cities of Nasiriyah, Hilla and Diwaniyah. Meanwhile, the Shi'ite infighting in Basra has forced British forces to stall the planned withdrawal of some 1,500 troops. Some 4,000 British troops have been hunkered down at the Basra airport after turning the city over to Iraqi forces last year. So far they have not been drawn from their base into this week's fighting there.
If the U.S. decides to actively go after the Shi'ite forces in the south, it would mean reopening a southern front where American forces once fought some of the Iraq war's fiercest battles against Sadr but now have only a shadow presence. That would involve draining the concentration of surge troops around Baghdad and the Sunni triangle. It might even require more troop extensions or additional deployments to hold ground and maintain modest gains. Moving against the Shi'ite strongholds could then open opportunities for the Sunni fighters of al-Qaeda to strike Iraqi and U.S. targets in the Sunni triangle as the American heat turns south.
This week's violence in Baghdad and Basra followed several days of bloodshed in the Shi'ite city of Kut, some 100 miles southeast of the capital, where Sadr loyalists clashed with police forces largely controlled by their Shi'ite rivals, the Badr Corps militants of the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq, and with government troops affiliated with Maliki's Da'awa party.
"This was expected. It was just a matter of timing," said Vali Nasr, Tufts University scholar and author of the bestselling book, The Shi'a Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future. "The ceasefire and the surge allowed everyone to regroup and rearm. There is still the Shi'a-Sunni conflict. There is still the Sadr-Badr conflict. The surge and the ceasefire merely kept them apart, but there has never been a real political settlement," he said. "No, the big battle for Iraq hasn't been fought yet. The future of Iraq has not been determined." Nasr said the question now remains just how deep U.S. forces will get sucked into a Shi'ite civil war.
Sadr's ceasefire did allow U.S. forces to concentrate on hunting al-Qaeda in Baghdad, Mosul and Diyala without having an open front in the south. But it also allowed the cleric to rearm, clean his own house and retake the reins of his splintering movement. However, Sadr's devoted rank and file seem to be itching for a fight now as the Iraqi government and their American backers take sides with rival factions and continue to crack down on Sadr's Jaish al Mahdi, or JAM. "Sadr has had an interest in making sure everyone knows he's still around," Nasr said. "He's not going to go down without a fight."
The conveniently quiet arrangement between Sadr and the U.S. is now being challenged from within and from without. "There are all kinds of groups who would be interested in dragging [Sadr] into positions and into conflicts that he doesn't want to be in," said Anthony Cordesman, a top Iraq analyst for the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Cordesman warns against jumping to conclusions that the south is rising up. He says it's more likely that the recent violence is a sign that the many Shi'ite factions that have broken from Sadr's movement are seeking to prove their mettle, and that al-Qaeda cells are seeking new ways to strike as they are forced out of more and more areas by U.S. and Iraqi forces.
Cordesman echoes Army Lt. Gen Ray Odierno, who, after leading U.S. forces in Iraq for the past 15 months, recently reported that Sadr seemed to be softening and his movement becoming more of a faith-based political movement than a militia waiting to kill Americans or take power by force. That said, Odierno expressed concern over the growing Shi'ite rivalries. "I worry about intra-Shi'a violence a bit," he said upon returning to the Pentagon earlier this month. "That could, you know, spiral out of control."
Find this article at:
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1725265,00.html
Friday, Feb. 22, 2008
Sadr Keeps Iraq Guessing
By Mark Kukis/Baghdad
Moqtada al-Sadr
Mehdi Army members escort Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr during his visit to the holy city of Najaf, Iraq, Feb. 27, 2006.
When the envelope was finally opened, Moqtada al-Sadr's message couldn't have been tamer. Having sent out sealed envelopes to Shi'ite mosques around Iraq containing his verdict on the future of the cease-fire observed by his Medhi Army, Iraq waited on tenterhooks for the message to be read at Friday prayers. "I'm extending the freeze of army activity," al-Sadr's statement read, ordering his militia to remain standing down until mid-August, when presumably the cleric will reconsider. Despite pressure from within his movement's ranks to end the cease-fire that, they complain, has been used by U.S. forces and al-Sadr's Shi'ite rivals to go after the organization, Friday's message hardly mentioned his many enemies in Iraq.
Many in Iraq had feared that Sadr would nix the cease-fire, a move likely to set off another round of sectarian violence and reverse many of the gains of the U.S. troop surge. But U.S. officials had expected that Sadr would maintain the pause, which has been a major factor in bringing down the overall level of violence in Iraq. Sadr had sent some signals to the Americans suggesting he was likely to extend the cease-fire. And U.S. officials, such as Gen. David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, believe that the Shi'ite firebrand may be changing his ways.
"We have seen a shift in Sadr's strategy, I believe," said Gen. Raymond Odierno, the ground commander for U.S. forces in Iraq. "He has talked more and more about moving toward a more humanitarian movement, a political movement more like his father had, and away from a more lethal, militia-type movement."
The Sadr movement has, of course, long been involved in social and political activism in addition to militia violence. Its activists can be found doing everything from from holding seats in parliament to offering cut-rate propane in poor Shi'ite neighborhoods. That the Sadrists might choose to emphasize some of these activities over armed confrontation is quite plausible, but Moqtada al-Sadr is notoriously unpredictable, and the thinking behind his moves is often unclear. Sadr could just as easily be simply biding his time until surge troops leave in July.
Yet Sadr learned in 2004, at great cost to his organization, that open confrontation with U.S. forces is a bad idea. The Mahdi Army fared poorly against U.S. troops in two separate uprisings in southern Iraq that year. In the years that followed, Sadr's militia fighters kept up a kind of shadow war against U.S. troops, staging sporadic guerrilla attacks. But the Mahdi Army has largely avoided confronting U.S. forces for years, and the cease-fire Sadr announced unexpectedly six months ago was not directed at the Americans as much as it was aimed at halting fighting between Sadr's followers and members of the rival Shi'ite Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and its Badr militia. Intra-Shi'ite fighting threatened al-Sadr's popularity, and it was in his interests to tamp things down. But the Sadrists and SIIC are still vying for control in much of southern Iraq, and their conflict is likely to flare up again. Al-Sadr may be calculating that it will be easier to fight his rivals in the summer, when there will be fewer American forces to stand in the way.
Extending the cease-fire also allows Sadr to distance himself from the thuggish violence of members of his militia, while keeping the organization intact despite U.S. and Iraqi government demands that he disband it.
So, while Friday's announcement was greeted with relief, most in Baghdad are still left wondering about Sadr's intentions and plans. "I'm always real modest about analyzing our capacity to analyze," said U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker. "We don't see very much of the Sadrists. And the those we do see I think definitely represent the clear political trend; they don't much like militias either. But what insight do we actually have into a very, very complex phenomenon? Not much."
Find this article at:
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1715535,00.html
THREATS WATCH
http://threatswatch.org/rapidrecon/2008/03/iran-not-alsadr-leading-shia-a/
Iran, Not al-Sadr, Leading Shi'a Attacks In Iraq
As Shi’a militias and armed groups strike out at US and Iraqi targets from Baghdad to Basra, it is curious to note how many news reports attribute the attacks to Muqtada al-Sadr, either directly or indirectly.
Rocket attacks on the U.S.-protected Green Zone may carry a message with implications across Iraq: rising anger within the Mahdi Army militia.
The Shiite fighters led by anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr are reorganizing their ranks, taking delivery of new weapons from Iran and ramping up complaints about crackdowns by U.S. and Iraqi forces that could unravel the Mahdi Army’s self-declared cease-fire, according to militia commanders.
But Muqtada al-Sadr was sidelined from any command by Iran weeks ago. There are no attributions of direct quotes, commands or comment from Muqtada since the Shi’a militia uprising began in earnest. And there is a very simple explanation for this: The puppet has had his strings cut. Iran is calling the shots.
The fact that his note exists is far more important than its specific wording.
“So far I did not succeed either to liberate Iraq or make it an Islamic society — whether because of my own inability or the inability of society, only God knows,” Sadr wrote.
“The continued presence of the occupiers, on the one hand, and the disobedience of many on the other, pushed me to isolate myself in protest. I gave society a big proportion of my life. Even my body became weaker, I got more sicknesses.”
In reality, the continued presence of his Iranian masters pushed him to isolate himself. Iran has changed other leadership positions and oriented other terrorist groups toward field operational leadership and away from political leadership. The IRGC commander was changed. Hizballah’s military command was stripped from Nasrallah and handed to sheikh Naim Qasim in the Bekaa Valley. And Hamas is effectively run by al-Qassam Brigades military commander Ahmed Jabari in Gaza, not Khalid Meshaal in Damascus nor Ismail Haniyeh in Gaza City.
As such, the militarily incompetent Muqtada al-Sadr has been yanked from control of the Mahdi Army. We are seeing the natural and intended progression of this change in Iraq today.
The shelling of the ‘Green Zone’ (or International Zone) in Baghdad in coordination with attacks throughout southern Iraq from Basra to Baghdad are not a reaction to an al-Sadr decision any more than they are the effects of his military leadership and command. They are the fruits of Iranian labor.
The rockets used in the Green Zone attacks “were Iranian-provided, Iranian-made rockets,” General Petraeus said.
Can we dismiss this from the most successful US commander in Iraq since the conflict began? Further, is it wise to also dismiss the trend of Iranian command changes across the board to operational ground commanders? And, is it wise to forget that Muqtada al-Sadr announced his seclusion and withdrawal from command (at the behest of his Iranian masters)?
In order to minimize or dismiss Iran’s guiding hand in the fighting in Iraq, one must do all of these things. And this is completely illogical. Completely.
Yet, so desperate some seem to avoid any conflict with Iran, they ignore that fact that Iran has already chosen the conflict, whether we like it or not.
It is an ‘Inconvenient Truth.’
By Steve Schippert on March 25, 2008 at 12:29 PM | Permalink
telegraph.co.uk
Q&A: Who is Moqtada al-Sadr?
By Damien McElroy
Last Updated: 2:15am GMT 26/03/2008
Who is Moqtada al-Sadr?
Iraq's leading insurgent and scion of one of the country's leading religious dynasties. The 35-year-old is a poor public speaker but holds enormous influence over mainly poor Shi'ites in Baghdad and Basra.
Moqtada al-Sadr, the radical cleric
Moqtada al-Sadr is gambling that he can withstand an onslaught by Iraqi forces
Regarded by the US as public enemy number one in Iraq after the execution of Saddam Hussein.
Has Sadr always been an enemy of the Baghdad government?
Sadr's rise was opposed by the US-led authority in Iraq. His newspaper was banned in 2004 for spreading hatred and an arrest warrant was issued against Sadr.
US marines fought Sadr's followers for control of Najaf the same year. Sadr's Mahdi army is the most powerful grassroots organisation in Iraq.
He boycotted the 2005 election but his allies won a substantial number of seats. He initially supported Nouri al-Maliki as prime minister of Iraq's Shi'ite-dominated coalition but relations broke down in 2007.
How is the Mahdi army seen in Iraq?
It depends where one stands on the sectarian divide. The Mahdi army spearheaded the worst fighting of Iraq's civil war. Its fighters now dominate eastern Baghdad and swathes of its western districts, areas which have been cleansed of Sunni Muslims. Elsewhere, Sadr generally gets credit for being the most nationalistic of Iraqi leaders.
Although his fighters have benefited from Iranian training and arms supplies, Sadr is viewed as an Arab nationalist. Despite declaring a ceasefire against American and British troops last August, he remains implacably opposed to the presence of foreign troops in Iraq.
What has the ceasefire achieved?
Gen David Petraeus, the American commander in Iraq, recognised that the move could dramatically curtail US military casualties. US spokesmen were instructed to draw the distinction between "responsible" followers of Sadr, who suspended fighting, and "special groups" of Shi'ite guerrillas, who continued the insurgency.
Where is he now?
Sadr is believed to have moved to Tehran last year and is studying to become an ayatollah in the holy city of Qom. He is said to have married an Iranian woman.
It is not clear how much control he exercises over the Mahdi army. A substantial part of the army still takes its orders from the Qods Force of Iran's Revolutionary Guards.
The ceasefire has been repeatedly tested by the "special groups", but Sadr's call for a civil revolt appears to have been prompted by the necessity of surviving the most aggressive bid by Iraq's security forces to assert the state's authority in Basra.
What happens next?
Sadr is gambling that he can withstand an onslaught by Iraqi forces without outright war. Purging extremists in his movement remains a work in progress.
The Iraqi army, despite its advantages of British and American training, does not have the organisation or discipline to drive his followers out of towns and cities across Iraq.
The best that can be hoped for is that Sadr supporters will acquiesce to a stronger security force and establish their support in provincial elections, due to be held in October.
The Middle East's Leading English Language Daily
SAUDI ARABIA
Wednesday 26 March 2008 (18 Rabi` al-Awwal 1429)
Editorial: Test in Basra
26 March 2008 —
The Iraqi government is seeking to reimpose its control of Basra, the country’s second city. Although this moment had to come — for any part of the country to be run as a lawless fiefdom is totally unacceptable — there is no denying it is a high-risk move for two key reasons.
This is the first major test for the new security forces, 50,000 of whom have been deployed into Basra. Will they demonstrate the training and ability to overcome the militias that have effectively run this city even before the British withdrew to the outskirts last September? Early evidence is that the gunmen have put up stiff resistance. If the fighting drags on, not only will the security forces face humiliation, but ordinary Basrawis will be in dire straits as they run out of food because markets are closed and the streets are battle zones.
The second concern is that the Shiite cleric Moqtada Sadr will denounce the truce which, since it came into effect last August, has done a great deal to reduce the level of violence in much of the country. Yesterday he threatened civil conflict. His men have thrown Iraqi police out of his political power base — the run-down Sadr City district of Baghdad where some two million Shiites live. But it remains to be seen if he really intends once again to take on the government and the occupation forces behind them.
For a start, the Mehdi Army is not the only government target in Basra. The Badr Brigade allied to the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC) and the smallest militia, the Fadhila, are also being assaulted by Iraqi police and army. These groups had been fighting each other and have been implicated in oil and narcotics smuggling. Outright criminal gangs have also been operating alongside or between them. The anarchic result in Iraq’s premier port and oil center is a serious threat to economic recovery. It is also questionable just how much control Sadr now has over neighborhood warlords who claim to act in his name. Despite renewing the cease-fire last month, so-called “rogue” elements throughout the Mehdi Army have stepped up attacks, particularly against Americans.
It may be significant that Sadr’s office has blamed the government’s Basra assault on “politics” ahead of expected provincial elections this autumn. This suggests the militia leader still values the political process. He quit the national unity government in November 2006, protesting Premier Maliki’s meeting with President Bush. The following January, Sadr and his people rejoined only to quit again four months later, demanding a timetable for the coalition’s withdrawal. He may have been influenced then by Iran president. President Ahmadinejad’s important recent visit to Baghdad, however, emphasized the need for political solutions, effectively wrong-footing Sadr’s tactics. The Iranian president may also have accepted, at least in principle, that Basra could no longer remain in divided chaos. The question for the militia leader is whether his power would increase through renewed conflict or if he tried to take his supporters back into the political process.
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csmonitor.com - The Christian Science Monitor Online
from the March 26, 2008 edition - http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0326/p01s13-woiq.html
Across Iraq, battles erupt with Mahdi Army
Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army fought US, Iraqi forces in Baghdad and Basra on Tuesday.
By Sam Dagher | Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
Baghdad
ShiIte Supporters: During a recent protest in Baghdad, protesters held signs in support of Iraq and cleric Moqtada al Sadr. Mr. Sadr's Mahdi Army has started a civil disobedience campaign.
ShiIte Supporters: During a recent protest in Baghdad, protesters held signs in support of Iraq and cleric Moqtada al Sadr. Mr. Sadr's Mahdi Army has started a civil disobedience campaign.
Thaier AL-Sudnai/Reuters
The Mahdi Army's seven-month-long cease-fire appears to have come undone.
Rockets fired from the capital's Shiite district of Sadr City slammed into the Green Zone Tuesday, the second time in three days, and firefights erupted around Baghdad pitting government and US forces against the militia allied to the influential Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.
At the same time, the oil-export city of Basra became a battleground Tuesday as Iraqi forces, backed by US air power, launched a major crackdown on the Mahdi Army elements. British and US forces were guarding the border with Iran to intercept incoming weapons or fighters, according to a senior security official in Basra.
The US blames the latest attacks on rogue Mahdi Army elements tied to Iran, but analysts say the spike in fighting with Shiite militants potentially opens a second front in the war when the American military is still doing battle with the Sunni extremists of Al Qaeda in Iraq.
"The cease-fire is over; we have been told to fight the Americans," said one Mahdi Army militiaman, who was reached by telephone in Sadr City. This same man, when interviewed in January, had stated that he was abiding by the cease-fire and that he was keeping busy running his cellular phone store.
Sadr City residents say they saw fighting Tuesday between Mahdi militiamen and US and Iraqi forces in several parts of the district. One eyewitness, in the adjacent neighborhood of Baghdad Jadida, who wished to remain anonymous, said he saw a heavy militia presence on the streets, with two fighters planting roadside bombs on a main thoroughfare.
Lt. Col. Steve Stover of the Baghdad-based 4th Infantry Division said that in the span of 12 hours Tuesday 16 rockets were fired at the Green Zone and nine rockets and 18 mortar rounds fell on US bases and combat outposts on the east side of Baghdad. A mortar round hit a US patrol in the northern Adhamiyah district, killing one US soldier. A roadside bomb set a US Humvee on fire in Sadr City but all soldiers inside survived. He said clashes broke out between American forces and militiamen when they attacked several government checkpoints in the district and that some of these posts are now manned by both US and Iraqi forces.
Almost exactly four years ago, American forces and Mr. Sadr's loyalists clashed on the streets of Baghdad's Sadr City and the holy city of Najaf shortly after the US shuttered his newspaper for allegedly inciting violence. That round of fighting lasted several months and at one point the Americans were aiming to arrest Sadr, a cleric whose religious credentials come from his father who was widely influential and loved.
The fighting burnished Sadr's standing among fellow Shiites wary of the US occupation. Over the years, the US has repeatedly accused elements within the Sadrist movement of having ties with Iran and even Lebanon's Hizbullah.
After rockets hit the Green Zone Sunday, US commander in Iraq Gen. David Petraeus said the weapons had been provided by Iran.
On Tuesday, Rear Adm. Greg Smith, spokesman for US-led multinational forces in Iraq, blamed the elite Quds units of Iran's Revolutionary Guards for supplying the 22 107-mm and 122-mm rockets that hit the heavily fortified area of Baghdad that is home to the US Embassy.
"We believe the violence is being instigated by members of special groups that are beholden to the Iranian Quds Force and not Sadr.... Although we are concerned, we know that very few Iraqis want a return to the violence they experienced before the surge," he says.
Admiral Smith says US and Iraqi forces were facing two distinct enemies in Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and the Iranian-trained and supplied special groups. But he adds, "AQI is still Iraq's No. 1 enemy."
There is growing concern, however, that Iran could respond to such US accusations. "This is pretty serious, and if the Iranians do not back down rapidly this will escalate," says Martin Navias, an analyst at Britain's Centre for Defence Studies at King's College in London. "The US has a number of problems with Iran, mainly the nuclear program and its behavior in Iraq. There are many people in the Bush administration who want to hit Iran."
While Iraqi troops fought with Shiite militants in Basra Tuesday, a contingent of Coalition troops, including British and US forces, mobilized at Basra's border with Iran to prevent militiamen from escaping or smuggling in ammunition and weapons, according to a senior security source in the city who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of his remarks.
The US military refused to comment on this, citing "security reasons" during ongoing operations, while another spokesman, Col. Bill Buckner, said the Basra operation was Iraqi-led and that the US was providing "limited assistance" mainly in "intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and ... support aircraft."
The US military has regularly accused Iran of smuggling weapons into Iraq over this border, particularly armor-piercing bombs known as explosively formed penetrators (EFP) that have been blamed for the deaths of many US soldiers in Iraq.
"This is a major operation aimed at outlaws and removing all heavy weapons and explosives from the hands of militias inside the city. It has now escalated into fighting between the Iraqi Army and the Mahdi Army because they are resisting," the security official said by phone from Basra, a few hours after the start of the offensive dubbed "The Knights' Assault."
The Basra-based official said that fighting is now centered in Mahdi Army strongholds in the neighborhoods of Tamimiyah, Hayaniyah, and Five Miles, and that there was also fighting in the neighboring provinces of Nasiriyah and Maysan.
A curfew has also been imposed in Nasiriyah and other southern cities, such as Samawa and Kut, the scene of clashes involving the Mahdi Army over the past two weeks.
One Basra resident reached by phone said he was holed up at his office at the local branch of the ministry of trade, and described the sound of explosions and gunfire as "terrifying."
Two Iraqi Army battalions and five battalions of the National Police's quick-reaction force were dispatched to Basra, where an entire Army division is already stationed.
"The lawlessness is going on under religious or political cover along with oil, weapons, and drug smuggling. These outlaws found support from inside government institutions either willingly or by coercion ... turning Basra into a place where no citizen can feel secure for his life and property," said Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in a statement read on state television, which reported that Mr. Maliki along with the ministers of defense and interior were all in Basra to oversee the operation.
The reaction from Sadr's camp was swift. At a press conference in the holy city of Najaf, three of the cleric's top lieutenants condemned the government offensive and accused Maliki, a Shiite, of carrying out a US agenda. They also threatened a nationwide campaign of protests and civil disobedience if US and Iraqi forces continued to fight the Mahdi Army.
Smith, the military spokesman, said the US would not stop this campaign if it remained peaceful.
One of the movement's leaders, Liwa Smaisim, described as "preposterous" US claims that it was only targeting splinter elements of the Mahdi Army.
Hazem al-Aaraji, another leader usually based in Baghdad, said the current fighting was a continuation of a campaign by the movement's Shiite rivals in the Iraqi government to finish it off – a drive it began last fall in southern Iraq.
Sadr's influence was felt throughout Baghdad Tuesday, highlighting the risk that the fight in Basra may spread to the capital, home to a large segment of his supporters. On Tuesday, witnesses reported that gun battles broke out in the capital's Sadr City district between the militia and rivals from the Badr Organization, which is part of Maliki's ruling Shiite coalition.
The offices of one of the branches of Maliki’s Dawa Party was torched in Sadr City, according to the US military.
On Monday evening, pickup trucks filled with chanting Mahdi militiamen, within sight of Iraqi forces, were forcing shopkeepers in many parts of Baghdad's west side to close in protest of US and Iraq Army raids.
On Tuesday, all shops in the Mahdi Army stronghold neighborhoods – Bayiaa, Iskan, Shuala, and Washash – were shuttered. Leaflets saying "No, no to America" were plastered on each storefront. Anti-American banners hung right next to Iraqi government checkpoints.
Several people interviewed in the Amel neighborhood said they were forced by militiamen to return home when they tried to go to work this morning. "This is anarchy," says Ali al-Yasseri.
• Awadh al-Taiee in Baghdad and a Najaf-based Iraqi journalist contributed reporting.
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Monday, Mar. 24, 2008
An Ominous Milestone in Iraq
By Charles Crain/Baghdad
A U.S. soldiers wait in an alley while on patrol in Baghdad, Iraq.
A U.S. soldiers wait in an alley while on patrol in Baghdad, Iraq.
Spencer Platt / Getty
Death had been taking something of a holiday in Iraq, but it seemed to come back from vacation with a vengeance on Easter, with ominous implications for American strategy. Sunday dawned in Baghdad's Green Zone with a barrage of mortars courtesy of Shi'ite militiamen. Several more mortars poured in throughout the day. Meanwhile, attacks across Iraq on Sunday killed dozens of people, including four American soldiers in a deadly roadside bombing in southern Baghdad. That last incident raised the number of U.S. military fatalities in Iraq to 4,000. While an American military spokesman pointed out that "no casualty is more or less significant than another," the timing of the ramped-up violence is telling. The trend comes as American troop strength — increased to implement the vaunted "surge" — continues to decline from heights reached in November.
For journalists who have covered this country through its darkest months, the barrage of mortars and the smoke plumes rising out of the Green Zone brought to mind Baghdad of a year ago, when the Iraqi capital was wracked by sectarian violence and terrorist attacks. For many Baghdadis, the violence served as a unnerving reminder that the improvements that have come with the "surge" are fragile, easily shattered. Said Mithal Alusi, a Green Zone resident and member of Iraq's parliament: "In a minute, in a second, just like that... we can fall into hell again."
After a sharp decline at the end of 2007, violence in Iraq seems to be on the upswing. The weekend's violence indicates that both the Sunni insurgency and the Shi'ite militias retain their ability and their desire to strike their enemies. The largest Shi'ite militia, the Mahdi Army, is observing a cease-fire and militia violence has fallen dramatically. But rogue elements of the organization continue to launch attacks against Americans. Sunday's mortars were launched from a Shi'ite enclave.
As often happens when Shi'ite militiamen launch mortars and rockets at the Green Zone, some of the missiles don't hit their intended target. Early risers in Karrada, just south of the Green Zone across the Tigris River, heard the distant rumble of a launch and then, seconds later, a crash that rattled windows and sent residents looking for cover. Karrada, home to a number of Shi'ite politicians, is often targeted by Sunni insurgents; Sunday morning it was the accidental victim of other Shi'ites. In an interview with the BBC, Gen. David Petraeus, commander of the U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq, said that he believed that Iran was behind the assault on the Green Zone. Petraeus and the U.S. military have been blaming Iran's Quds special forces for masterminding Shi'ite militia violence against the U.S.
Across Baghdad, especially on the city's east side, the Mahdi Army continues to operate from de facto safe havens. The Americans cooperate with local leaders and cannot be too aggressive, lest they upset the fragile truce that has mostly held since the end of August. But as U.S. troops leave the Iraqi capital the balance of power may once again shift to the militia. The mortars were a reminder that the Mahdi Army is waiting the Americans out, not giving way to them.
Meanwhile, bombings killed dozens of Iraqis. In Mosul a suicide bomber drove into a military base and killed at least 13 police officers, according to the Associated Press. Mosul is the latest hotbed of insurgent violence. Seven Iraqis were also killed when a suicide bomber targeted a Shi'ite neighborhood in Baghdad. The tactics and the targets are both hallmarks of the Sunni insurgency. The American troop surge and the defection of some insurgent groups to the American side has put tremendous pressure on radical religious insurgent groups like al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). American commanders still call AQI the biggest threat to Iraqi security. Just as their nemeses in the Shi'ite militias seem to have weathered the storm of the American troop surge, the Sunni insurgency has proven resilient as well. With reporting by Bobby Ghosh/Baghdad
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http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1725109,00.html
BBC News
Last Updated: Monday, 24 March 2008, 15:21 GMT
Iran 'behind Green Zone attack'
Gen Petraeus said he was surprised how Sunnis turned against al-Qaeda
General Petraeus
The most senior US general in Iraq has said he has evidence that Iran was behind Sunday's bombardment of Baghdad's heavily fortified Green Zone.
Gen David Petraeus told the BBC he thought Tehran had trained, equipped and funded insurgents who fired the barrage of mortars and rockets.
He said Iran was adding what he described as "lethal accelerants" to a very combustible mix.
There has as yet been no response from Iran to the accusations.
The rockets that were launched at the Green Zone yesterday, for example... were Iranian-provided, Iranian-made rockets
Gen David Petraeus
Interest in Iraq slumps
Troop toll 'no milestone'
In response to the news that 4,000 US military personnel have now been killed in Iraq, he said it showed how much the mission had cost but added that Americans were realistic about it.
He also said a great deal of progress had been made because of the "flipping" of communities - the decision by Sunni tribes to turn against al-Qaeda militants.
The extent of this had surprised even the US military, he said.
'Promises violated'
In an interview with BBC world affairs editor John Simpson, Gen Petraeus said violence in Iraq was being perpetuated by Iran's Quds Force, a branch of the Revolutionary Guards.
Smoke rising from the Green Zone
The attacks led to 15 civilian deaths
"The rockets that were launched at the Green Zone yesterday, for example... were Iranian-provided, Iranian-made rockets," he said, adding that the groups that fired them were funded and trained by the Quds Force.
"All of this in complete violation of promises made by President Ahmadinejad and the other most senior Iranian leaders to their Iraqi counterparts."
The barrage hit the Green Zone on Sunday morning. Some rockets missed their targets killing 15 Iraqi civilians.
Later in the day four US soldiers died when their patrol vehicle was blown up by a bomb in southern Baghdad, putting the total number of US fatalities above 4,000.
This and other bloodshed on Sunday came despite an overall reduction in violence since last June, when the US deployed an extra 30,000 troops for the surge.
Days earlier, Mr Bush marked the fifth anniversary of the invasion, saying that it had made the world a better place.
telegraph.co.uk
Basra is the test
Last Updated: 12:01am GMT 26/03/2008
The military offensive launched Tuesday in Basra by Nouri al-Maliki, the Iraqi prime minister, to "cleanse" the city of militiamen loyal to the rabble-rousing Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr needs to succeed. It is the first serious test of the ability of the Iraqi army to impose order unaided (other than with air support) by allied forces.
Training and equipping the Iraqi military to a level that allows them to maintain internal security has been a prime objective of the post-invasion strategy. If the operation in Basra works, it will be something of a landmark in a process of post-war reconstruction that has proved painfully difficult.
The near-anarchy that is now being tackled in Basra will add weight to the criticism that American commanders have levelled at the British for withdrawing from the city to the nearby airbase, where they have taken up a non-combatant, overwatch role.
The Americans complain that just as their aggressive surge strategy was beginning to pay dividends in Baghdad and the level of violence was falling, Britain was pursuing the opposite strategy, with wholly predictable consequences. In fact, the real roots of the unrest in Iraq's southern city run much deeper.
As Sir Hilary Synnott, the British diplomat sent in to run southern Iraq after the invasion, has pointed out, there was a "complete absence" of any post-war plan, a fact confirmed at the weekend by Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair's former chief of staff. Gordon Brown has already conceded in principle that this failure should be the subject of a full inquiry; we see no grounds for delaying such a move.
The danger now is that the assault against Sadr's Mahdi army will prompt unrest elsewhere - the Shia cities of Kut, Nasiriyah and Samawa were all put under curfew Tuesday.
If the Basra operation is the first real test of the Iraqi army's credibility, there will surely be many more in the months and years to come before the coalition forces can contemplate complete withdrawal. Yet if there can be no swift exit, success in Basra will at least offer the prospect of a glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel.
Monday, Mar. 24, 2008
The Threat of a Re-Surge in Iraq
By Darrin Mortenson
General David Petraeus
General David Petraeus is due to report to Congress on the progress of the surge on April 8 and 9
Could Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's attempts to re-establish control over Basra backfire? There is a growing possibility that it could become a wider intra-Shi'ite war, drawing in the forces loyal to radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, whose ceasefire has been key to the success of the U.S. "surge"? If so, the consequences for American military strategy in Iraq in an all-important political year will be grave.
Maliki's government targeted Basra because it could. Unlike many other southern cities where fighting has escalated in recent weeks, Maliki has built an independent power base among the security forces there. But Tuesday's sweep of Basra could turn sour in other southern cities where the central government's power is weak. Indeed, many Shi'ites are seeing this not just as an example of the Shi'ite Maliki taking on other Shi'ites (including Sadrists) but of America backing the Prime Minister up in a de facto Shi'a civil war. Iraqi government forces have attacked Shi'ite militias and gangs in at least seven major southern Iraq cities in the past two weeks. And America has been there to support Maliki's troops every time.
In response, Sadr loyalists have already taken to the streets in Baghdad, where U.S. troops will have to deal with the backlash. U.S. officials have so far shied away from blaming Sadr for the recent rise of violence (including an Easter attack on the Green Zone), mostly because Sadr's ceasefire has been key to the success of the surge. (General David Petraeus has pointed the finger at Iran instead.) But as clashes increase, they may not be able to dance around it for much longer.
The violence is escalating as Patraeus, the architect of the nine-month military "surge" involving some 30,000 extra troops in Iraq, prepares for a scheduled Apr. 8 and 9 report to congress on his progress in Iraq. They also come as he and Defense Secretary Robert Gates waffle over whether to withdraw five combat brigades by July, reducing troop levels down from about 158,000 to 140,000 — the pre-surge peak. If the fighting spreads to other southern cities and attacks by Shi'ite militias increase, intra-Shiite violence may be the wrench that jams the whole works of a meaningful reduction of troops.
While the focus this weekend on attacks on Baghdad has now turned towards Basra, violence has surged for weeks throughout the Shi'ite south, where Americans have suffered fresh losses in old haunts in the cities of Nasiriyah, Hilla and Diwaniyah. Meanwhile, the Shi'ite infighting in Basra has forced British forces to stall the planned withdrawal of some 1,500 troops. Some 4,000 British troops have been hunkered down at the Basra airport after turning the city over to Iraqi forces last year. So far they have not been drawn from their base into this week's fighting there.
If the U.S. decides to actively go after the Shi'ite forces in the south, it would mean reopening a southern front where American forces once fought some of the Iraq war's fiercest battles against Sadr but now have only a shadow presence. That would involve draining the concentration of surge troops around Baghdad and the Sunni triangle. It might even require more troop extensions or additional deployments to hold ground and maintain modest gains. Moving against the Shi'ite strongholds could then open opportunities for the Sunni fighters of al-Qaeda to strike Iraqi and U.S. targets in the Sunni triangle as the American heat turns south.
This week's violence in Baghdad and Basra followed several days of bloodshed in the Shi'ite city of Kut, some 100 miles southeast of the capital, where Sadr loyalists clashed with police forces largely controlled by their Shi'ite rivals, the Badr Corps militants of the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq, and with government troops affiliated with Maliki's Da'awa party.
"This was expected. It was just a matter of timing," said Vali Nasr, Tufts University scholar and author of the bestselling book, The Shi'a Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future. "The ceasefire and the surge allowed everyone to regroup and rearm. There is still the Shi'a-Sunni conflict. There is still the Sadr-Badr conflict. The surge and the ceasefire merely kept them apart, but there has never been a real political settlement," he said. "No, the big battle for Iraq hasn't been fought yet. The future of Iraq has not been determined." Nasr said the question now remains just how deep U.S. forces will get sucked into a Shi'ite civil war.
Sadr's ceasefire did allow U.S. forces to concentrate on hunting al-Qaeda in Baghdad, Mosul and Diyala without having an open front in the south. But it also allowed the cleric to rearm, clean his own house and retake the reins of his splintering movement. However, Sadr's devoted rank and file seem to be itching for a fight now as the Iraqi government and their American backers take sides with rival factions and continue to crack down on Sadr's Jaish al Mahdi, or JAM. "Sadr has had an interest in making sure everyone knows he's still around," Nasr said. "He's not going to go down without a fight."
The conveniently quiet arrangement between Sadr and the U.S. is now being challenged from within and from without. "There are all kinds of groups who would be interested in dragging [Sadr] into positions and into conflicts that he doesn't want to be in," said Anthony Cordesman, a top Iraq analyst for the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Cordesman warns against jumping to conclusions that the south is rising up. He says it's more likely that the recent violence is a sign that the many Shi'ite factions that have broken from Sadr's movement are seeking to prove their mettle, and that al-Qaeda cells are seeking new ways to strike as they are forced out of more and more areas by U.S. and Iraqi forces.
Cordesman echoes Army Lt. Gen Ray Odierno, who, after leading U.S. forces in Iraq for the past 15 months, recently reported that Sadr seemed to be softening and his movement becoming more of a faith-based political movement than a militia waiting to kill Americans or take power by force. That said, Odierno expressed concern over the growing Shi'ite rivalries. "I worry about intra-Shi'a violence a bit," he said upon returning to the Pentagon earlier this month. "That could, you know, spiral out of control."
Find this article at:
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1725265,00.html
Friday, Feb. 22, 2008
Sadr Keeps Iraq Guessing
By Mark Kukis/Baghdad
Moqtada al-Sadr
Mehdi Army members escort Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr during his visit to the holy city of Najaf, Iraq, Feb. 27, 2006.
When the envelope was finally opened, Moqtada al-Sadr's message couldn't have been tamer. Having sent out sealed envelopes to Shi'ite mosques around Iraq containing his verdict on the future of the cease-fire observed by his Medhi Army, Iraq waited on tenterhooks for the message to be read at Friday prayers. "I'm extending the freeze of army activity," al-Sadr's statement read, ordering his militia to remain standing down until mid-August, when presumably the cleric will reconsider. Despite pressure from within his movement's ranks to end the cease-fire that, they complain, has been used by U.S. forces and al-Sadr's Shi'ite rivals to go after the organization, Friday's message hardly mentioned his many enemies in Iraq.
Many in Iraq had feared that Sadr would nix the cease-fire, a move likely to set off another round of sectarian violence and reverse many of the gains of the U.S. troop surge. But U.S. officials had expected that Sadr would maintain the pause, which has been a major factor in bringing down the overall level of violence in Iraq. Sadr had sent some signals to the Americans suggesting he was likely to extend the cease-fire. And U.S. officials, such as Gen. David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, believe that the Shi'ite firebrand may be changing his ways.
"We have seen a shift in Sadr's strategy, I believe," said Gen. Raymond Odierno, the ground commander for U.S. forces in Iraq. "He has talked more and more about moving toward a more humanitarian movement, a political movement more like his father had, and away from a more lethal, militia-type movement."
The Sadr movement has, of course, long been involved in social and political activism in addition to militia violence. Its activists can be found doing everything from from holding seats in parliament to offering cut-rate propane in poor Shi'ite neighborhoods. That the Sadrists might choose to emphasize some of these activities over armed confrontation is quite plausible, but Moqtada al-Sadr is notoriously unpredictable, and the thinking behind his moves is often unclear. Sadr could just as easily be simply biding his time until surge troops leave in July.
Yet Sadr learned in 2004, at great cost to his organization, that open confrontation with U.S. forces is a bad idea. The Mahdi Army fared poorly against U.S. troops in two separate uprisings in southern Iraq that year. In the years that followed, Sadr's militia fighters kept up a kind of shadow war against U.S. troops, staging sporadic guerrilla attacks. But the Mahdi Army has largely avoided confronting U.S. forces for years, and the cease-fire Sadr announced unexpectedly six months ago was not directed at the Americans as much as it was aimed at halting fighting between Sadr's followers and members of the rival Shi'ite Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and its Badr militia. Intra-Shi'ite fighting threatened al-Sadr's popularity, and it was in his interests to tamp things down. But the Sadrists and SIIC are still vying for control in much of southern Iraq, and their conflict is likely to flare up again. Al-Sadr may be calculating that it will be easier to fight his rivals in the summer, when there will be fewer American forces to stand in the way.
Extending the cease-fire also allows Sadr to distance himself from the thuggish violence of members of his militia, while keeping the organization intact despite U.S. and Iraqi government demands that he disband it.
So, while Friday's announcement was greeted with relief, most in Baghdad are still left wondering about Sadr's intentions and plans. "I'm always real modest about analyzing our capacity to analyze," said U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker. "We don't see very much of the Sadrists. And the those we do see I think definitely represent the clear political trend; they don't much like militias either. But what insight do we actually have into a very, very complex phenomenon? Not much."
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http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1715535,00.html
THREATS WATCH
http://threatswatch.org/rapidrecon/2008/03/iran-not-alsadr-leading-shia-a/
Iran, Not al-Sadr, Leading Shi'a Attacks In Iraq
As Shi’a militias and armed groups strike out at US and Iraqi targets from Baghdad to Basra, it is curious to note how many news reports attribute the attacks to Muqtada al-Sadr, either directly or indirectly.
Rocket attacks on the U.S.-protected Green Zone may carry a message with implications across Iraq: rising anger within the Mahdi Army militia.
The Shiite fighters led by anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr are reorganizing their ranks, taking delivery of new weapons from Iran and ramping up complaints about crackdowns by U.S. and Iraqi forces that could unravel the Mahdi Army’s self-declared cease-fire, according to militia commanders.
But Muqtada al-Sadr was sidelined from any command by Iran weeks ago. There are no attributions of direct quotes, commands or comment from Muqtada since the Shi’a militia uprising began in earnest. And there is a very simple explanation for this: The puppet has had his strings cut. Iran is calling the shots.
The fact that his note exists is far more important than its specific wording.
“So far I did not succeed either to liberate Iraq or make it an Islamic society — whether because of my own inability or the inability of society, only God knows,” Sadr wrote.
“The continued presence of the occupiers, on the one hand, and the disobedience of many on the other, pushed me to isolate myself in protest. I gave society a big proportion of my life. Even my body became weaker, I got more sicknesses.”
In reality, the continued presence of his Iranian masters pushed him to isolate himself. Iran has changed other leadership positions and oriented other terrorist groups toward field operational leadership and away from political leadership. The IRGC commander was changed. Hizballah’s military command was stripped from Nasrallah and handed to sheikh Naim Qasim in the Bekaa Valley. And Hamas is effectively run by al-Qassam Brigades military commander Ahmed Jabari in Gaza, not Khalid Meshaal in Damascus nor Ismail Haniyeh in Gaza City.
As such, the militarily incompetent Muqtada al-Sadr has been yanked from control of the Mahdi Army. We are seeing the natural and intended progression of this change in Iraq today.
The shelling of the ‘Green Zone’ (or International Zone) in Baghdad in coordination with attacks throughout southern Iraq from Basra to Baghdad are not a reaction to an al-Sadr decision any more than they are the effects of his military leadership and command. They are the fruits of Iranian labor.
The rockets used in the Green Zone attacks “were Iranian-provided, Iranian-made rockets,” General Petraeus said.
Can we dismiss this from the most successful US commander in Iraq since the conflict began? Further, is it wise to also dismiss the trend of Iranian command changes across the board to operational ground commanders? And, is it wise to forget that Muqtada al-Sadr announced his seclusion and withdrawal from command (at the behest of his Iranian masters)?
In order to minimize or dismiss Iran’s guiding hand in the fighting in Iraq, one must do all of these things. And this is completely illogical. Completely.
Yet, so desperate some seem to avoid any conflict with Iran, they ignore that fact that Iran has already chosen the conflict, whether we like it or not.
It is an ‘Inconvenient Truth.’
By Steve Schippert on March 25, 2008 at 12:29 PM | Permalink
telegraph.co.uk
Q&A: Who is Moqtada al-Sadr?
By Damien McElroy
Last Updated: 2:15am GMT 26/03/2008
Who is Moqtada al-Sadr?
Iraq's leading insurgent and scion of one of the country's leading religious dynasties. The 35-year-old is a poor public speaker but holds enormous influence over mainly poor Shi'ites in Baghdad and Basra.
Moqtada al-Sadr, the radical cleric
Moqtada al-Sadr is gambling that he can withstand an onslaught by Iraqi forces
Regarded by the US as public enemy number one in Iraq after the execution of Saddam Hussein.
Has Sadr always been an enemy of the Baghdad government?
Sadr's rise was opposed by the US-led authority in Iraq. His newspaper was banned in 2004 for spreading hatred and an arrest warrant was issued against Sadr.
US marines fought Sadr's followers for control of Najaf the same year. Sadr's Mahdi army is the most powerful grassroots organisation in Iraq.
He boycotted the 2005 election but his allies won a substantial number of seats. He initially supported Nouri al-Maliki as prime minister of Iraq's Shi'ite-dominated coalition but relations broke down in 2007.
How is the Mahdi army seen in Iraq?
It depends where one stands on the sectarian divide. The Mahdi army spearheaded the worst fighting of Iraq's civil war. Its fighters now dominate eastern Baghdad and swathes of its western districts, areas which have been cleansed of Sunni Muslims. Elsewhere, Sadr generally gets credit for being the most nationalistic of Iraqi leaders.
Although his fighters have benefited from Iranian training and arms supplies, Sadr is viewed as an Arab nationalist. Despite declaring a ceasefire against American and British troops last August, he remains implacably opposed to the presence of foreign troops in Iraq.
What has the ceasefire achieved?
Gen David Petraeus, the American commander in Iraq, recognised that the move could dramatically curtail US military casualties. US spokesmen were instructed to draw the distinction between "responsible" followers of Sadr, who suspended fighting, and "special groups" of Shi'ite guerrillas, who continued the insurgency.
Where is he now?
Sadr is believed to have moved to Tehran last year and is studying to become an ayatollah in the holy city of Qom. He is said to have married an Iranian woman.
It is not clear how much control he exercises over the Mahdi army. A substantial part of the army still takes its orders from the Qods Force of Iran's Revolutionary Guards.
The ceasefire has been repeatedly tested by the "special groups", but Sadr's call for a civil revolt appears to have been prompted by the necessity of surviving the most aggressive bid by Iraq's security forces to assert the state's authority in Basra.
What happens next?
Sadr is gambling that he can withstand an onslaught by Iraqi forces without outright war. Purging extremists in his movement remains a work in progress.
The Iraqi army, despite its advantages of British and American training, does not have the organisation or discipline to drive his followers out of towns and cities across Iraq.
The best that can be hoped for is that Sadr supporters will acquiesce to a stronger security force and establish their support in provincial elections, due to be held in October.
The Middle East's Leading English Language Daily
SAUDI ARABIA
Wednesday 26 March 2008 (18 Rabi` al-Awwal 1429)
Editorial: Test in Basra
26 March 2008 —
The Iraqi government is seeking to reimpose its control of Basra, the country’s second city. Although this moment had to come — for any part of the country to be run as a lawless fiefdom is totally unacceptable — there is no denying it is a high-risk move for two key reasons.
This is the first major test for the new security forces, 50,000 of whom have been deployed into Basra. Will they demonstrate the training and ability to overcome the militias that have effectively run this city even before the British withdrew to the outskirts last September? Early evidence is that the gunmen have put up stiff resistance. If the fighting drags on, not only will the security forces face humiliation, but ordinary Basrawis will be in dire straits as they run out of food because markets are closed and the streets are battle zones.
The second concern is that the Shiite cleric Moqtada Sadr will denounce the truce which, since it came into effect last August, has done a great deal to reduce the level of violence in much of the country. Yesterday he threatened civil conflict. His men have thrown Iraqi police out of his political power base — the run-down Sadr City district of Baghdad where some two million Shiites live. But it remains to be seen if he really intends once again to take on the government and the occupation forces behind them.
For a start, the Mehdi Army is not the only government target in Basra. The Badr Brigade allied to the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC) and the smallest militia, the Fadhila, are also being assaulted by Iraqi police and army. These groups had been fighting each other and have been implicated in oil and narcotics smuggling. Outright criminal gangs have also been operating alongside or between them. The anarchic result in Iraq’s premier port and oil center is a serious threat to economic recovery. It is also questionable just how much control Sadr now has over neighborhood warlords who claim to act in his name. Despite renewing the cease-fire last month, so-called “rogue” elements throughout the Mehdi Army have stepped up attacks, particularly against Americans.
It may be significant that Sadr’s office has blamed the government’s Basra assault on “politics” ahead of expected provincial elections this autumn. This suggests the militia leader still values the political process. He quit the national unity government in November 2006, protesting Premier Maliki’s meeting with President Bush. The following January, Sadr and his people rejoined only to quit again four months later, demanding a timetable for the coalition’s withdrawal. He may have been influenced then by Iran president. President Ahmadinejad’s important recent visit to Baghdad, however, emphasized the need for political solutions, effectively wrong-footing Sadr’s tactics. The Iranian president may also have accepted, at least in principle, that Basra could no longer remain in divided chaos. The question for the militia leader is whether his power would increase through renewed conflict or if he tried to take his supporters back into the political process.
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csmonitor.com - The Christian Science Monitor Online
from the March 26, 2008 edition - http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0326/p01s13-woiq.html
Across Iraq, battles erupt with Mahdi Army
Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army fought US, Iraqi forces in Baghdad and Basra on Tuesday.
By Sam Dagher | Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
Baghdad
ShiIte Supporters: During a recent protest in Baghdad, protesters held signs in support of Iraq and cleric Moqtada al Sadr. Mr. Sadr's Mahdi Army has started a civil disobedience campaign.
ShiIte Supporters: During a recent protest in Baghdad, protesters held signs in support of Iraq and cleric Moqtada al Sadr. Mr. Sadr's Mahdi Army has started a civil disobedience campaign.
Thaier AL-Sudnai/Reuters
The Mahdi Army's seven-month-long cease-fire appears to have come undone.
Rockets fired from the capital's Shiite district of Sadr City slammed into the Green Zone Tuesday, the second time in three days, and firefights erupted around Baghdad pitting government and US forces against the militia allied to the influential Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.
At the same time, the oil-export city of Basra became a battleground Tuesday as Iraqi forces, backed by US air power, launched a major crackdown on the Mahdi Army elements. British and US forces were guarding the border with Iran to intercept incoming weapons or fighters, according to a senior security official in Basra.
The US blames the latest attacks on rogue Mahdi Army elements tied to Iran, but analysts say the spike in fighting with Shiite militants potentially opens a second front in the war when the American military is still doing battle with the Sunni extremists of Al Qaeda in Iraq.
"The cease-fire is over; we have been told to fight the Americans," said one Mahdi Army militiaman, who was reached by telephone in Sadr City. This same man, when interviewed in January, had stated that he was abiding by the cease-fire and that he was keeping busy running his cellular phone store.
Sadr City residents say they saw fighting Tuesday between Mahdi militiamen and US and Iraqi forces in several parts of the district. One eyewitness, in the adjacent neighborhood of Baghdad Jadida, who wished to remain anonymous, said he saw a heavy militia presence on the streets, with two fighters planting roadside bombs on a main thoroughfare.
Lt. Col. Steve Stover of the Baghdad-based 4th Infantry Division said that in the span of 12 hours Tuesday 16 rockets were fired at the Green Zone and nine rockets and 18 mortar rounds fell on US bases and combat outposts on the east side of Baghdad. A mortar round hit a US patrol in the northern Adhamiyah district, killing one US soldier. A roadside bomb set a US Humvee on fire in Sadr City but all soldiers inside survived. He said clashes broke out between American forces and militiamen when they attacked several government checkpoints in the district and that some of these posts are now manned by both US and Iraqi forces.
Almost exactly four years ago, American forces and Mr. Sadr's loyalists clashed on the streets of Baghdad's Sadr City and the holy city of Najaf shortly after the US shuttered his newspaper for allegedly inciting violence. That round of fighting lasted several months and at one point the Americans were aiming to arrest Sadr, a cleric whose religious credentials come from his father who was widely influential and loved.
The fighting burnished Sadr's standing among fellow Shiites wary of the US occupation. Over the years, the US has repeatedly accused elements within the Sadrist movement of having ties with Iran and even Lebanon's Hizbullah.
After rockets hit the Green Zone Sunday, US commander in Iraq Gen. David Petraeus said the weapons had been provided by Iran.
On Tuesday, Rear Adm. Greg Smith, spokesman for US-led multinational forces in Iraq, blamed the elite Quds units of Iran's Revolutionary Guards for supplying the 22 107-mm and 122-mm rockets that hit the heavily fortified area of Baghdad that is home to the US Embassy.
"We believe the violence is being instigated by members of special groups that are beholden to the Iranian Quds Force and not Sadr.... Although we are concerned, we know that very few Iraqis want a return to the violence they experienced before the surge," he says.
Admiral Smith says US and Iraqi forces were facing two distinct enemies in Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and the Iranian-trained and supplied special groups. But he adds, "AQI is still Iraq's No. 1 enemy."
There is growing concern, however, that Iran could respond to such US accusations. "This is pretty serious, and if the Iranians do not back down rapidly this will escalate," says Martin Navias, an analyst at Britain's Centre for Defence Studies at King's College in London. "The US has a number of problems with Iran, mainly the nuclear program and its behavior in Iraq. There are many people in the Bush administration who want to hit Iran."
While Iraqi troops fought with Shiite militants in Basra Tuesday, a contingent of Coalition troops, including British and US forces, mobilized at Basra's border with Iran to prevent militiamen from escaping or smuggling in ammunition and weapons, according to a senior security source in the city who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of his remarks.
The US military refused to comment on this, citing "security reasons" during ongoing operations, while another spokesman, Col. Bill Buckner, said the Basra operation was Iraqi-led and that the US was providing "limited assistance" mainly in "intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and ... support aircraft."
The US military has regularly accused Iran of smuggling weapons into Iraq over this border, particularly armor-piercing bombs known as explosively formed penetrators (EFP) that have been blamed for the deaths of many US soldiers in Iraq.
"This is a major operation aimed at outlaws and removing all heavy weapons and explosives from the hands of militias inside the city. It has now escalated into fighting between the Iraqi Army and the Mahdi Army because they are resisting," the security official said by phone from Basra, a few hours after the start of the offensive dubbed "The Knights' Assault."
The Basra-based official said that fighting is now centered in Mahdi Army strongholds in the neighborhoods of Tamimiyah, Hayaniyah, and Five Miles, and that there was also fighting in the neighboring provinces of Nasiriyah and Maysan.
A curfew has also been imposed in Nasiriyah and other southern cities, such as Samawa and Kut, the scene of clashes involving the Mahdi Army over the past two weeks.
One Basra resident reached by phone said he was holed up at his office at the local branch of the ministry of trade, and described the sound of explosions and gunfire as "terrifying."
Two Iraqi Army battalions and five battalions of the National Police's quick-reaction force were dispatched to Basra, where an entire Army division is already stationed.
"The lawlessness is going on under religious or political cover along with oil, weapons, and drug smuggling. These outlaws found support from inside government institutions either willingly or by coercion ... turning Basra into a place where no citizen can feel secure for his life and property," said Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in a statement read on state television, which reported that Mr. Maliki along with the ministers of defense and interior were all in Basra to oversee the operation.
The reaction from Sadr's camp was swift. At a press conference in the holy city of Najaf, three of the cleric's top lieutenants condemned the government offensive and accused Maliki, a Shiite, of carrying out a US agenda. They also threatened a nationwide campaign of protests and civil disobedience if US and Iraqi forces continued to fight the Mahdi Army.
Smith, the military spokesman, said the US would not stop this campaign if it remained peaceful.
One of the movement's leaders, Liwa Smaisim, described as "preposterous" US claims that it was only targeting splinter elements of the Mahdi Army.
Hazem al-Aaraji, another leader usually based in Baghdad, said the current fighting was a continuation of a campaign by the movement's Shiite rivals in the Iraqi government to finish it off – a drive it began last fall in southern Iraq.
Sadr's influence was felt throughout Baghdad Tuesday, highlighting the risk that the fight in Basra may spread to the capital, home to a large segment of his supporters. On Tuesday, witnesses reported that gun battles broke out in the capital's Sadr City district between the militia and rivals from the Badr Organization, which is part of Maliki's ruling Shiite coalition.
The offices of one of the branches of Maliki’s Dawa Party was torched in Sadr City, according to the US military.
On Monday evening, pickup trucks filled with chanting Mahdi militiamen, within sight of Iraqi forces, were forcing shopkeepers in many parts of Baghdad's west side to close in protest of US and Iraq Army raids.
On Tuesday, all shops in the Mahdi Army stronghold neighborhoods – Bayiaa, Iskan, Shuala, and Washash – were shuttered. Leaflets saying "No, no to America" were plastered on each storefront. Anti-American banners hung right next to Iraqi government checkpoints.
Several people interviewed in the Amel neighborhood said they were forced by militiamen to return home when they tried to go to work this morning. "This is anarchy," says Ali al-Yasseri.
• Awadh al-Taiee in Baghdad and a Najaf-based Iraqi journalist contributed reporting.
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Monday, Mar. 24, 2008
An Ominous Milestone in Iraq
By Charles Crain/Baghdad
A U.S. soldiers wait in an alley while on patrol in Baghdad, Iraq.
A U.S. soldiers wait in an alley while on patrol in Baghdad, Iraq.
Spencer Platt / Getty
Death had been taking something of a holiday in Iraq, but it seemed to come back from vacation with a vengeance on Easter, with ominous implications for American strategy. Sunday dawned in Baghdad's Green Zone with a barrage of mortars courtesy of Shi'ite militiamen. Several more mortars poured in throughout the day. Meanwhile, attacks across Iraq on Sunday killed dozens of people, including four American soldiers in a deadly roadside bombing in southern Baghdad. That last incident raised the number of U.S. military fatalities in Iraq to 4,000. While an American military spokesman pointed out that "no casualty is more or less significant than another," the timing of the ramped-up violence is telling. The trend comes as American troop strength — increased to implement the vaunted "surge" — continues to decline from heights reached in November.
For journalists who have covered this country through its darkest months, the barrage of mortars and the smoke plumes rising out of the Green Zone brought to mind Baghdad of a year ago, when the Iraqi capital was wracked by sectarian violence and terrorist attacks. For many Baghdadis, the violence served as a unnerving reminder that the improvements that have come with the "surge" are fragile, easily shattered. Said Mithal Alusi, a Green Zone resident and member of Iraq's parliament: "In a minute, in a second, just like that... we can fall into hell again."
After a sharp decline at the end of 2007, violence in Iraq seems to be on the upswing. The weekend's violence indicates that both the Sunni insurgency and the Shi'ite militias retain their ability and their desire to strike their enemies. The largest Shi'ite militia, the Mahdi Army, is observing a cease-fire and militia violence has fallen dramatically. But rogue elements of the organization continue to launch attacks against Americans. Sunday's mortars were launched from a Shi'ite enclave.
As often happens when Shi'ite militiamen launch mortars and rockets at the Green Zone, some of the missiles don't hit their intended target. Early risers in Karrada, just south of the Green Zone across the Tigris River, heard the distant rumble of a launch and then, seconds later, a crash that rattled windows and sent residents looking for cover. Karrada, home to a number of Shi'ite politicians, is often targeted by Sunni insurgents; Sunday morning it was the accidental victim of other Shi'ites. In an interview with the BBC, Gen. David Petraeus, commander of the U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq, said that he believed that Iran was behind the assault on the Green Zone. Petraeus and the U.S. military have been blaming Iran's Quds special forces for masterminding Shi'ite militia violence against the U.S.
Across Baghdad, especially on the city's east side, the Mahdi Army continues to operate from de facto safe havens. The Americans cooperate with local leaders and cannot be too aggressive, lest they upset the fragile truce that has mostly held since the end of August. But as U.S. troops leave the Iraqi capital the balance of power may once again shift to the militia. The mortars were a reminder that the Mahdi Army is waiting the Americans out, not giving way to them.
Meanwhile, bombings killed dozens of Iraqis. In Mosul a suicide bomber drove into a military base and killed at least 13 police officers, according to the Associated Press. Mosul is the latest hotbed of insurgent violence. Seven Iraqis were also killed when a suicide bomber targeted a Shi'ite neighborhood in Baghdad. The tactics and the targets are both hallmarks of the Sunni insurgency. The American troop surge and the defection of some insurgent groups to the American side has put tremendous pressure on radical religious insurgent groups like al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). American commanders still call AQI the biggest threat to Iraqi security. Just as their nemeses in the Shi'ite militias seem to have weathered the storm of the American troop surge, the Sunni insurgency has proven resilient as well. With reporting by Bobby Ghosh/Baghdad
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http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1725109,00.html
BBC News
Last Updated: Monday, 24 March 2008, 15:21 GMT
Iran 'behind Green Zone attack'
Gen Petraeus said he was surprised how Sunnis turned against al-Qaeda
General Petraeus
The most senior US general in Iraq has said he has evidence that Iran was behind Sunday's bombardment of Baghdad's heavily fortified Green Zone.
Gen David Petraeus told the BBC he thought Tehran had trained, equipped and funded insurgents who fired the barrage of mortars and rockets.
He said Iran was adding what he described as "lethal accelerants" to a very combustible mix.
There has as yet been no response from Iran to the accusations.
The rockets that were launched at the Green Zone yesterday, for example... were Iranian-provided, Iranian-made rockets
Gen David Petraeus
Interest in Iraq slumps
Troop toll 'no milestone'
In response to the news that 4,000 US military personnel have now been killed in Iraq, he said it showed how much the mission had cost but added that Americans were realistic about it.
He also said a great deal of progress had been made because of the "flipping" of communities - the decision by Sunni tribes to turn against al-Qaeda militants.
The extent of this had surprised even the US military, he said.
'Promises violated'
In an interview with BBC world affairs editor John Simpson, Gen Petraeus said violence in Iraq was being perpetuated by Iran's Quds Force, a branch of the Revolutionary Guards.
Smoke rising from the Green Zone
The attacks led to 15 civilian deaths
"The rockets that were launched at the Green Zone yesterday, for example... were Iranian-provided, Iranian-made rockets," he said, adding that the groups that fired them were funded and trained by the Quds Force.
"All of this in complete violation of promises made by President Ahmadinejad and the other most senior Iranian leaders to their Iraqi counterparts."
The barrage hit the Green Zone on Sunday morning. Some rockets missed their targets killing 15 Iraqi civilians.
Later in the day four US soldiers died when their patrol vehicle was blown up by a bomb in southern Baghdad, putting the total number of US fatalities above 4,000.
This and other bloodshed on Sunday came despite an overall reduction in violence since last June, when the US deployed an extra 30,000 troops for the surge.
Days earlier, Mr Bush marked the fifth anniversary of the invasion, saying that it had made the world a better place.
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